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Abstract: Privacy preserving data usage ensures appropriate usage of data without 
compromising sensitive information. Data privacy is a primary requirement since 
customers’ data is an asset to any organization and it contains customers’ private 
information. Data seclusion cannot be a solution to keep data private. Data sharing as well 
as keeping data private is important for different purposes, e.g., company welfare, research, 
business etc.  A broad range of industries where data privacy is mandatory includes 
healthcare, aviation industry, education system, federal law enforcement, etc. 
In this thesis dissertation we focus on data privacy schemes in emerging fields of computer 
science, namely, health informatics, data mining, distributed cloud, biometrics, and mobile 
payments. Linking and mining medical records across different medical service providers 
are important to the enhancement of health care quality. Under HIPAA regulation keeping 
medical records private is important. In real-world health care databases, records may well 
contain errors. Linking the error-prone data and preserving data privacy at the same time 
is very difficult. We introduce a privacy preserving Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm to 
enable medical records linkage for error–prone medical records. Mining frequent 
sequential patterns such as, patient path, treatment pattern, etc., across multiple medical 
sites helps to improve health care quality and research. We propose a privacy preserving 
sequential pattern mining scheme across multiple medical sites. In a distributed cloud 
environment resources are provided by users who are geographically distributed over a 
large area. Since resources are provided by regular users, data privacy and security are 
main concerns. We propose a privacy preserving data storage mechanism among different 
users in a distributed cloud. Managing secret key for encryption is difficult in a distributed 
cloud. To protect secret key in a distributed cloud we propose a multilevel threshold secret 
sharing mechanism. Biometric authentication ensures user identity by means of user’s 
biometric traits. Any individual’s biometrics should be protected since biometrics are 
unique and can be stolen or misused by an adversary. We present a secure and privacy 
preserving biometric authentication scheme using watermarking technique. Mobile 
payments have become popular with the extensive use of mobile devices. Mobile 
applications for payments needs to be very secure to perform transactions and at the same 
time needs to be efficient. We design and develop a mobile application for secure mobile 
payments. To secure mobile payments we focus on user’s biometric authentication as well 
as secure bank transaction. We propose a novel privacy preserving biometric authentication 
algorithm for secure mobile payments.  
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. MOTIVATION ................................................................................................................ 4 
1.1.1. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN HEALTH CARE ............................................... 4 
1.1.2. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN DISTRIBUTED CLOUD ENVIRONMENT .... 5 
1.1.3. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION ................. 7 
1.1.4. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN MOBILE PAYMENTS ..................................... 7 
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS ......................................................................................................... 9 
1.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINE ......................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................... 13 
PRIVACY PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES ................................................................ 13 
2.1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION ............................................................................... 13 
2.2. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION .............................................................. 14 
2.3. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER ............................................................................................. 15 
2.4. ORDER PRESERVING ENCRYPTION ...................................................................... 15 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 23 
DESIGNING AN ALGORITHM TO PRESERVE PRIVACY FOR MEDICAL 
RECORD LINKAGE WITH ERROR-PRONE DATA ................................................... 23 
3.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 23 
3.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 25 
3.3. SCHEMES ..................................................................................................................... 27 
3.3.1. SCHEME FOR ERROR-PRONE DATA .............................................................. 28 
3.3.1.1. ALGORITHM .................................................................................................... 30 
3.3.2. SCHEMES FOR ERROR-FREE DATA ............................................................... 31 
3.4. SYSTEM ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 33 
3.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 33 
vii 
3.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 34 
3.4.3. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 34 
3.5. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 35 
3.5.1. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................................................... 35 
3.5.2.  EXPERIMENTAL SETUP .................................................................................... 41 
3.5.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ............................................................................... 42 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................ 45 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 46 
PRIVACY PRESERVING SEQUENTIAL PATTERN MINING ACROSS MULTIPLE 
MEDICAL SITES ............................................................................................................. 46 
4.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 46 
4.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 49 
4.3. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................... 50 
4.3.1. BASIC NOTATIONS ............................................................................................ 50 
4.3.2. SLPMINER ALGORITHM ................................................................................... 51 
4.3.3. SIMILARITY MEASUREMENT ......................................................................... 52 
4.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................ 52 
4.5. PROPOSED SOLUTION .............................................................................................. 53 
4.5.1. ALGORITHM ........................................................................................................ 54 
4.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 55 
4.6.1. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ............................................................................... 55 
4.7. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 57 
4.7.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 57 
4.7.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 58 
4.7.3. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 58 
4.8. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 58 
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................... 60 
MULTILEVEL THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING IN DISTRIBUTED CLOUD ...... 60 
viii 
5.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 60 
5.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 62 
5.3. PROPOSED SOLUTION .............................................................................................. 63 
5.3.1. PRELIMINARIES ..................................................................................................... 63 
5.3.1.1. SHAMIR’S THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING ............................................. 63 
5.3.1.2. CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM .............................................................. 64 
5.3.2. PROPOSED SCHEME .............................................................................................. 64 
5.3.2.1. ALGORITHM .................................................................................................... 66 
ALGORITHM5. 2. SPLIT ALGORITHM ............................................................................ 67 
ALGORITHM 5.3.RECONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM .................................................... 67 
5.4. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 68 
5.4.1. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 68 
5.4.2. SECURITY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 70 
5.5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 71 
CHAPTER VI ................................................................................................................... 72 
PRIVACY PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE .................................. 72 
6.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 72 
6.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 73 
6.3. SECURITY AND PRIVACY PRESERVING MECHANISM ..................................... 75 
6.3.1. ALGORITHM ........................................................................................................ 76 
ALGORITHM 6.1. STORING DATA ON RESOURCE PROVIDERS............................... 76 
ALGORITHM 6.2: RETRIEVE THE DATA FROM RESOURCE PROVIDERS .............. 77 
6.4. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 78 
6.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 78 
6.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 78 
6.4.3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 79 
6.5. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................ 80 
CHAPTER VII .................................................................................................................. 81 
ix 
SECURE AND PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION USING 
WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE ................................................................................. 81 
7.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 81 
7.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 83 
7.3. PRELIMINARIES ......................................................................................................... 84 
7.3.1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION ....................................................................... 84 
7.3.2. SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION ........................................................... 84 
7.4. PROPOSED SOLUTION .............................................................................................. 85 
7.4.1. ALGORITHM ........................................................................................................ 86 
Algorithm 7.1. ........................................................................................................................ 87 
7.5. SYSTEM ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 88 
7.5.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 88 
7.5.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 88 
7.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 89 
7.6.1. EXPERIMENT SETUP ......................................................................................... 89 
7.6.2. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 89 
7.8. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 91 
CHAPTER VIII ................................................................................................................ 92 
PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION FOR SECURE MOBILE 
PAYMENTS .................................................................................................................................. 92 
8.1. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 92 
8.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION........................................................................................ 94 
8.3. SCHEMES ..................................................................................................................... 94 
8.3.1. PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC BASED AUTHENTICATION 
ALGORITHM........................................................................................................................ 95 
8.3.2. SECURE TRANSACTION USING RSA ENCRYPTION SCHEME .................. 97 
8.4. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 98 
8.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 98 
8.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 99 
x 
8.4.3. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 99 
8.5. IMPROVING OUR SYSTEM USING CLOUD CONCEPT ...................................... 100 
8.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 101 
8.6.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP .................................................................................. 101 
8.6.2. METRICS ............................................................................................................ 101 
8.6.3. RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 102 
8.7. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 105 
CHAPTER IX ................................................................................................................. 106 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ....................................................................... 106 
9.1. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 106 
9.2. FUTURE WORK ......................................................................................................... 107 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 110 
 
  
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Overview of Computing Environments ............................................................................ 3 
Figure 2: Focus of Computing Environments in this thesis ............................................................. 4 
Figure 3: Distributed Cloud Model ................................................................................................... 5 
Figure 4: Privacy Preserving Record Linkage Problem ................................................................. 24 
Figure 5: Data from two hospitals ................................................................................................. 26 
Figure 6: Overall flow of the solution ............................................................................................ 28 
Figure 7: Snapshot of selecting a module ...................................................................................... 36 
Figure 8: Snapshot of selecting a collaborator ............................................................................... 36 
Figure 9: The work flow of the system .......................................................................................... 38 
Figure 10: Snapshot of selecting an encryption scheme ................................................................ 39 
Figure 11: Flow of Error Tolerant Linking Algorithm between two parties when they are already 
connected and the dataset name, attributes are known to party B ................................................. 40 
Figure 12: Snapshot of showing matching result in our system .................................................... 41 
Figure 13: Matching Record Management Module ....................................................................... 41 
Figure 14: Computation time for SHA -1 for 100 records with varying number .......................... 43 
Figure 15: Computation time for SHA -2 for 100 records with varying number of attributes of 
four, six and eight. ......................................................................................................................... 43 
Figure 16: Computation time for Error –Tolerant Linking Algorithm with varying patients’ 
records from Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set where each record has 4 attributes ........................ 44 
Figure 17: Computation time for Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm with varying  patients’ 
records and varying attributes from Heart Disease Data Set ......................................................... 45 
Figure 18: Overview of the scenario .............................................................................................. 49 
Figure 19: Patient Databases from two hospitals ........................................................................... 50 
Figure 20: Proposed multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme .................................................. 66 
Figure 21: Time to split shares and distribute them to other nodes ............................................... 69 
Figure 22: Time to retrieve shares and combine them ................................................................... 70 
Figure 23: Overall view of proposed scheme ................................................................................ 75 
Figure 24: File Size - Elapsed Time .............................................................................................. 79 
Figure 25: Overall flow of the authentication mechanism ............................................................. 86 
Figure 26: Computation time of watermarking for different file sizes .......................................... 90 
Figure 27: Computation time of encryption for different file sizes ............................................... 90 
Figure 28: Computation time to calculate distance for different file sizes .................................... 91 
Figure 29: Secure Transaction using RSA encryption scheme ...................................................... 98 
Figure 30: Encryption time at end – user ..................................................................................... 103 
Figure 31: Computation time in Server........................................................................................ 104 
Figure 32: Elapse time in Log In Procedure ................................................................................ 105
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the rapid growth of data sharing, online banking, mobile banking, online shopping, data 
analysis etc., organizations store large amount of data about different entities (e.g., patients, 
customers, products, students, etc.).  Data about different entities has always been a top priority for 
more than two decades for different purposes such as, company statistics, predictions, data usage 
trends, etc. The sources of these data can be any industry such as, health care, banks, shopping 
records, colleges, libraries, etc.  Any particular organization not only stores their data privately or 
performs computations on them but also sometimes share their data with other organizations. Data 
may contain sensitive information about its entities. Hence for an organization their database poses 
a threat to the privacy of their entities. Although databases contain sensitive data, sharing data 
among different organizations is beneficial for different purposes, e.g., company welfare, research, 
business, etc. To overcome the threat to sensitive data organizations share their data in a privacy 
preserving way, i.e., without revealing sensitive information to other organizations with whom they 
share data.  Sharing data in a privacy preserving way is a real challenge as it involves sharing data 
among two or more number of parties without revealing confidential information. 
Preserving privacy of data is needed in a wide range of various scenarios in everyday life.  Some 
examples in this wide range of scenarios are outlined below: 
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 In the health care industry patients’ medical record or information may be shared among 
different health care providers, e.g., hospitals , pharmacies, health insurance carriers, etc. to 
improve patients’ treatment. Under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) regulations [1], preserving patient’s privacy is important and no patient’s data apart 
from the requested ones should be disclosed.  
 In the education system, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) [2] states 
that any educational agencies and institutions under a program administered by U. S. 
Department of Education cannot disclose any information about student’s grades, enrollment, 
billing information or behaviors without permission from a parent or eligible student. 
Therefore no educational institution can disclose any student’s data and even if they share 
student information they should do that in a privacy preserving manner to meet FERPA 
requirements.  
 To investigate a criminal case federal law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI needs 
information about the suspects from different sources, such as the local police, military, 
suspects’ employer, Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV), and Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). Data mining using social networking data analysis is used by criminal investigators to 
get a picture of the suspects such as their bank accounts, telephone numbers and location. 
These procedures for criminal investigations need data exchange among different institutions 
or organizations in a privacy preserving way so that no additional information, such as 
information about unrelated suspects is revealed.  
 In the aviation industry, for safety reasons the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [3] 
checks each and every passenger’s details on each flight from/to the US. The DHS denies 
boarding or disembarkation to passengers based on several secret lists such as the Terror 
Watch List (TWL), No Fly list etc. To do that the aviation industry shares a passenger’s 
sensitive information with DHS. To preserve privacy about innocent passengers’ data the 
3 
data should be exchanged in such a way so that DHS will only receive details about only 
those passengers who are on their watch lists.  
Modern or emergent computing environments consist of many different paradigms as show in Fig. 
1. In this thesis we focus on health care, data mining, biometrics, mobile payments, and distributed 
cloud computing environments (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Computing Environments 
 
We propose privacy preserving algorithms in these computing environments, particularly on 
privacy preserving techniques in health care, data mining, biometrics, distributed cloud 
environment and mobile payments environment as shown in Fig. 2.  
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Figure 2: Focus of Computing Environments in this thesis 
 
1.1. MOTIVATION 
1.1.1. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN HEALTH CARE 
 
With the popularity of electronic patient records and the expanded use of medical information 
systems [4], many different health care providers store medical records of patients electronically. 
To enhance the quality of health care treatment, often it is required to collect patients’ information 
from different healthcare providers. In many cases different health care providers hold the same 
patient’s data. Public health surveillance often requires linking patient records of the same patient 
from different health care providers [4].  In [5] to identify whether a particular patient’s information 
is held by more than one health care provider, a matching technique is used on the key attributes of 
patient’s demographic information.  
5 
To analyze and identify frequent patterns from medical databases, data mining plays an important 
role. In health informatics patterns are very common as it contains patterns in symptoms of any 
disease, patterns in patient paths, patterns in curing methods of any particular disease, patterns in 
patients’ daily activity etc. [61]. Sequential pattern mining from multiple medical institutions 
databases help to enhance healthcare quality by making predictions and detecting events based on 
existing patterns in the databases.  
In order to monitor the quality of health care treatment provided in a region and to analyze a 
patient’s medication interaction, it is necessary to collect correlated data from different sources 
such as, clinics, pharmacy, laboratory and health care providers. With the increasing need to keep, 
link and mine electronic patient records, it becomes very challenging to maintain security and 
preserve privacy. Under HIPAA regulations, preserving patient’s privacy is vitally important. As 
medical databases contain different identifiers of a patient, e.g., patient’s name, surname, date of 
birth, SSN, contact no., address, etc., using these identifiers for linking or sharing the patterns in 
patients’ data violate patient privacy. Moreover due to privacy, security, and business concerns 
different health care providers may not be willing to reveal their health data information other than 
the linking or mining result to the other provider. 
1.1.2. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN DISTRIBUTED CLOUD ENVIRONMENT 
 
Cloud computing is being increasingly used in both business and academic fields. Cloud computing 
refers to a way of computing over the internet where dynamically scaled shared resources (mostly 
virtual) are provided as a service to avoid costs of resource over provisioning. Cloud computing 
[9] is a combination of several concepts from virtualization [62], resource pooling, resource 
monitoring, dynamic provisioning, utility computing, multi-tenancy and elasticity. All cloud 
providers provide services defined by their service models, such as, Infrastructure as a Service, 
Platform as a Service, or Software as a Service. Companies like Amazon, Google, IBM, and Yahoo 
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are leading providers of some of the services offered by the cloud. Characteristics of cloud such as 
elasticity, broad network access makes the use of cloud more scalable and cost effective.  
A distributed cloud is formed using existing resources and it provides storage and computation 
resources similar to the existing cloud to users in a distributed peer-to-peer fashion.  Distributed 
cloud has all the characteristics of existing cloud architecture including proper management of 
resources, scalability and data security.  The distributed cloud is more than an existing cloud with 
multiple data centers distributed in different locations. In the distributed cloud model shown in Fig. 
3, resource providers (RP) are distinctive i.e. these distributed cloud servers are individuals with 
resources to offer. Users of the distributed cloud discover these resource providers and request for 
using resources. Nodes in the distributed cloud can be both users and resource providers (RP). The 
distributed cloud uses a completely decentralized mechanism to discover and allocate resources. 
Network constraints will become less using the distributed cloud which is internet based, because 
data and resources distributed would be closer and is therefore more  
 
Figure 3: Distributed Cloud Model 
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likely to be accessed from closer location. Moreover latency would be reduced because resources 
would be chosen closer to the users. We intend to use multi-valued hash table mechanism for 
resource discovery and use a game theoretic mechanism for allocating the resources available in a 
distributed cloud. The distributed cloud is dynamic in nature as users come in and out of the system. 
In a distributed cloud users store and do computation on resources provided by other users. This 
requires a secure and privacy preserving mechanism to store and retrieve data. Users of the 
distributed cloud have control over resource selection which makes them capable of performing 
encryption techniques to secure data. However protecting and managing the secret keys are of 
concern in a distributed cloud environment. 
1.1.3. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
 
Authentication plays an important role in identifying or authenticating a user. Authentication is 
based on what a user knows (e.g., password, PIN) or what a user has (e.g., token, chip card). 
However, these can be disclosed, stolen, forgotten or lost. Biometric authentication is a secure way 
to authenticate any user since it is related to the uniqueness of a user’s characteristics such as the 
physiological or behavioral characteristics of a user (e.g., finger print, iris, face image, 
handwriting). Though biometric traits are unique and secure, unimodal biometric authentications 
that uses single biometric trait have some limitations [63, 64]. It is vulnerable to spoof attacks, 
noise in sensed data, distinctiveness and, non-universality. One way to overcome the limitation is 
using more than one biometric traits of a user which uses more than one biometric trait. Although 
multimodal biometrics is secure for authentication purposes, it is still possible to steal or forge 
when attacked by any determined attacker [65]. Privacy of biometric traits of any individual should 
be preserved and should not be compromised under any circumstance since it represents their 
unique traits. 
1.1.4. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN MOBILE PAYMENTS  
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Mobile payments have become popular with the extensive use of user friendly hand-held mobile 
devices and easily available wireless networks [6].  Such payment systems are supported by many 
leading IT industries such as PayPal, Google, Apple etc. Mobile Payments and M-commerce [7] 
refer to the purchases made by mobile devices such as smart phones.  Although mobile devices are 
widely used for different purposes including mobile payments and mobile banking etc., it has 
limited computational power and cannot therefore provide a highly secure environment. To 
enhance security and improve performance, cloud computing [8] can be used for storing large 
volumes of data and also provide high computational resources. Although biometrics [10] provides 
more security, its high complexity requires large storage and computational resources. Performing 
user authentication is one of the most important steps to prevent unauthorized users. There are 
different authentication mechanisms [11] such as password based, token based, identity based and 
biometric based. Biometric authentication [12] refers to identification of a user based on their 
characteristics or behavior. There are different biometric factors such as iris, face, fingerprint and 
voice recognitions that are currently being used. The cloud’s advantages such as scalability and 
high computing power make biometric mechanisms more feasible and enhance security needed for 
highly secure applications such as banking. However biometric mechanisms come with privacy 
issues [13] as biometric information is highly sensitive. Hence we need to have appropriate secure 
privacy preserving mechanisms when using biometric features. 
Different existing mobile payment applications use different mechanisms [14], e.g., account-based, 
token-based, password-based etc. Any unauthorized user with access to these mobile devices and 
passwords can exploit these payment mechanisms. So we use a secure and privacy preserving 
biometric authentication mechanism to access these mobile payment applications. Since Biometric 
data is highly sensitive we need to protect privacy of user biometrics.  Moreover biometric 
authentication requires high computation power and it is time consuming therefore a light weight 
9 
biometric authentication mechanism using the cloud would be a solution to privacy preserving 
mobile payments authentication mechanism. 
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
This dissertation topic proposes novel privacy preserving algorithms for newly emergent 
computing environments, namely privacy preserving techniques in health informatics, data mining, 
distributed cloud, biometric, authentication, and mobile payments environments. The major 
contributions are as follows: 
 Privacy Preserving Medical Record Linkage Algorithm with Error-Prone Data: In 
the health care industry, often patients’ medical record or information has to be shared 
among different health care providers, e.g., hospitals, pharmacies, health insurance carriers, 
etc. to improve patients’ treatment. Under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) regulations, preserving patient’s privacy is important and a health care 
provider can only disclose a patient’s data for whom the data is requested. We have 
proposed a newly designed privacy preserving linking algorithm named the Error-Tolerant 
Linking Algorithm that allows the error-prone data to be correctly matched if the distance 
between the two records is below a threshold. We designed and developed a comprehensive 
and user-friendly software system that provides privacy preserving record linkage 
functions for medical service providers. 
 Privacy Preserving Sequential Pattern Mining Across Multiple Medical Sites: 
Sequential pattern mining is essential in medical research to identify patterns in patient 
path, disease treatments, analysis of DNA sequences etc. However, privacy is a concern 
when mining data across multiple medical sites that contain private, sensitive information. 
We introduce a privacy preserving sequential pattern mining scheme across multiple 
medical sites. 
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 Multilevel Threshold Secret Sharing in Distributed Cloud: Threshold secret sharing 
scheme [99] is widely used to secure different computing environments. It can be used to 
reduce the risks of managing secret keys. We propose a multilevel threshold secret sharing 
scheme to provide security of secret key in the distributed cloud. 
 Privacy Preserving Distributed Cloud Storage:  Cloud computing models store data and 
computing resources in virtual servers located in large data centers’ using a centralized 
architecture. A distributed cloud uses resources provided by users who are geographically 
distributed over a large area. The distributed cloud is decentralized and resources are 
provided in a P2P fashion. Since the resources are provided by regular users, security and 
privacy of data storage and computing resources are main concerns. We propose a privacy 
preserving storage and file sharing mechanism among different users in a distributed cloud. 
 Privacy Preserving Biometric Authentication using Watermarking Technique: 
Biometric authentication ensures user identity by means of users’ biometric traits. Though 
biometrics is unique and secure, it can be still stolen or misused by any adversary. 
Watermarking is used for content authentication, copyright management and tamper 
detection. We propose a secure and privacy preserving biometric authentication scheme 
using a watermarking technique. 
 Privacy Preserving Biometric Authentication in Mobile Payments: Mobile payments 
provide additional security than traditional credit cards. Present online authentication 
mechanisms do not provide adequate security for mobile payments and are vulnerable to 
several security challenges, e.g., confidentiality, authentication, authorization, integrity etc. 
There is therefore a need for enhanced and efficient secure privacy preserving mobile 
payment mechanisms. We present a privacy preserving biometric authentication technique 
in mobile payments. 
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1.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINE  
 
The thesis dissertation is organized as follows: 
 In chapter 2 we discuss different privacy preserving techniques. We study existing privacy 
preserving techniques in health informatics, database and data mining, authentication, the 
cloud and mobile payments environments. 
 In chapter 3 we study different existing record linkage schemes in healthcare. We introduce 
our novel Privacy Preserving Error-Tolerant Linking algorithm. We have designed and 
developed a comprehensive and user friendly software with a novel privacy preserving 
algorithm that provides privacy preserving record linkage across multiple medical sites 
such that it meets HIPAA regulations. Across multiple medical service providers the novel 
Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm provides privacy with error-prone data without 
requiring a trusted third party.  
 In chapter 4 we study existing privacy preserving data mining and sequential pattern 
mining techniques. Chapter 4 also presents a novel algorithm for privacy preserving 
sequential pattern mining that meets the HIPAA regulations.  A salient feature of our 
algorithm is that it can be applied across multiple medical sites and publishes the common, 
most frequent sequential patterns from those sites without revealing patients sensitive 
information. To mine sequential patterns at each site we use the SLPMiner algorithm [81]. 
Cryptographic techniques and similarity measurement have been used to find frequent 
sequential patterns across multiple medical sites while protecting the privacy of patients’ 
data. 
 Chapter 5 introduces a multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme to enhance the security 
of secret keys in a distributed cloud environment. We create replicas of secret shares and 
distribute them among multiple resource providers to ensure availability. 
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 Chapter 6 presents a privacy preserving storage and file sharing mechanism among 
different users in a distributed cloud. This mechanism involves processing, storing and 
retrieving encrypted data in a secure and privacy preserving manner. 
 In chapter 7 we propose a secure and privacy preserving biometric authentication scheme 
using a watermarking technique. We watermark a user’s face image with a finger print and 
encrypt the watermarked biometric to protect its privacy from an adversary. For privacy 
preserving authentication we use encrypted watermarked biometrics. 
 In chapter 8 we introduce a secure privacy preserving biometric authenticated mobile 
payment mechanism. We propose a novel algorithm named Privacy-Preserving Biometric-
based Authentication Algorithm to protect user biometrics. We also design and develop a 
privacy preserving mobile payments application which consists of privacy preserving log 
in and secure transaction. For secure transaction we incorporate the RSA scheme [15] on a 
direct debit method [14, 16, 58]. 
 In chapter 9 we present conclusion from our research work and research works that we 
intend to do in future. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRIVACY PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES 
 
In this thesis dissertation we concentrate on cryptographic approaches to privacy preserving. The 
different types of cryptographic privacy preserving techniques are homomorphic encryption, secure 
multi-party computation, oblivious transfer, order- preserving encryption, zero – knowledge proofs, 
oblivious keyword search, searchable encryption, private information retrieval, differential privacy, 
frequency preserving encryption  etc.  Some of these techniques are discussed below:  
2.1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
 
Homomorphic encryption schemes allow specific types of computations on cipher text and supports 
homomorphism. In this technique, arithmetic computation on the cipher text generates encrypted 
result and when decrypted the result matches with the result of arithmetic operations on plain texts 
without inherent loss because of the encryption.  In group theory homomorphism is a mapping 𝜑 ∶
𝐺 → 𝐻, given (𝐺,⋆) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐻,⋄) such that  
∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐺, 𝜑(𝑥 ⋆ 𝑦) = 𝜑(𝑥) ⋄  𝜑(𝑦) 
Whereas in ring theory, homomorphism is a mapping  𝜑 ∶ 𝑅 → 𝑆 that respects both addition and 
multiplication. Therefore,  
∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅, 𝜑(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝜑(𝑥) +  𝜑(𝑦) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑(𝑥𝑦) =  𝜑(𝑥) 𝜑(𝑦) 
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The homomorphic encryption schemes which are limited by the preservation of a single operation 
such as a group homomorphism is known as partially homomorphic encryption and those which 
preserves both of the addition and multiplication, such as ring homomorphism is known as fully 
homomorphic encryption. Several cryptosystems, e.g., ElGamal, RSA, Paillier, Benaloh, etc. [15, 
17, 18] support the partially homomorphism, that is, these cryptosystems preserves the structure 
addition or multiplication but cannot do both at the same time. For example, RSA and ElGamal 
[15, 17] supports the multiplicative homomorphic property, i.e., if 𝐸(𝑥)denotes the ciphertext of 
plain text x then according to multiplicative homomorphism, 𝐸(𝑥1)  ∙ 𝐸(𝑥2) = 𝐸(𝑥1  ∙ 𝑥2). 
Whereas the additive homomorphic property of Paillier cryptosystem [18] denotes that, 𝐸(𝑥1) ∙
𝐸(𝑥2) = 𝐸(𝑥1  + 𝑥2). Several applications, such as, E-Voting, E-Cash, cloud computing, private 
information retrieval use partially homomorphic encryption. The fully homomorphic property 
preserves the addition, multiplication structure of ring homomorphism modulo 2. Using fully 
homomorphic encryption any arbitrary computation can be performed on cipher texts preserving 
the encryption. In 2009, Craig Gentry proposed the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
[19] using ideal lattices structure in ring theory. In this scheme the plaintext is injected with a 
certain level of noise during encryption. Each operation on the cipher texts results in compounding 
the noise and the compounding noise yields the loss of homomorphic property after certain number 
of operations. Although the noise production followed by noise reduction makes the scheme 
impractical, it was a significant breakthrough in cryptography. The fully homomorphic property 
can be applied on several scenarios, including private queries on search engines and cloud 
computing. In our thesis we exploit the partially homomorphic property of the ElGamal 
cryptosystem and Paillier cryptosystem to apply it to health care and mobile payments environment 
respectively. 
2.2. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION 
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The secure multi-party computation relies on the secure two-party computation introduced by Yao 
[20] where two parties can compute a function 𝑓 on their inputs  𝑥, 𝑦 while keeping their inputs 
private. No party can learn anything about the other party’s input and the adversary is semi-honest. 
This constant-round protocol privately computes the probabilistic polynomial-time functionality 𝑓 
on the inputs and uses a technique called garbled circuits. For example, Part A has input x and Party 
B has input y and the protocol works by having one of the parties, say Party A, first generates an 
“encrypted” or “garbled” circuit 𝑓(𝑥, . ) which is then transferred to Party B who obtains a series 
of keys for his input using a private 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer Protocol of |𝑦|  instances. 
Nothing can be learned at this stage from the encrypted circuit but Party B can obtain the output 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) by “decrypting” the circuit. The decryption is partial here to ensure that nothing is learned 
beyond the output  𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦).  
2.3. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER 
 
In this cryptographic approach the sender sends one of the many potentially pieces of information 
and the receiver comes to know only about the information. Receiver remains oblivious to what 
piece of information has been transferred. Suppose the sender has the information  𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 
and the receiver wants to retrieve  𝑥𝑖 . This protocol ensures that the sender does not learn which 
message is received and the receiver learns no other message. This technique is applied for 
exchanging secrets, private information retrieval, protocol for signing contracts and electronic cash 
scheme. This scheme was first introduced by Rabin [137].  
2.4. ORDER PRESERVING ENCRYPTION 
 
Conventional cryptographic techniques degrade the performance of database systems as cipher 
texts do not preserve the numerical orders of the corresponding plaintexts and therefore B-trees can 
no longer be used for any range queries [21]. Order preserving encryption techniques preserve the 
same order of the cipher texts as the order of the plain texts [21, 22]. The idea behind this type of 
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encryption technique is to apply range queries, indexing, query processing, binary search on 
encrypted data as exactly and efficiently as it can be done on unencrypted data. Order preserving 
schemes are often used in dictionary based string compression [23, 24]. Besides the conventional 
database application of order preserving encryption, it is also used in cloud computing for secure 
ranked keyword search over encrypted cloud data [25].  
2.5. ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF 
Zero knowledge proof (ZKP) [26, 27] is a public cryptosystem to make the data secure against 
chosen cipher text attack. In this technique one party, say Party A proves to another party, say Party 
B that a statement is true. In the whole procedure of proving, Party A does not convey any other 
information apart from the fact that the statement is true and Party B also cannot learn anything as 
a result. Therefore Party B gains zero knowledge. It forces any malicious user to behave according 
to a predetermined protocol. Provided that one way functions exist, ZKP exists for any NP set.  
To preserve privacy many techniques have been developed and applied in different fields, including 
health informatics, database, data mining, cloud computing, authentication. [1, 28] illustrate some 
privacy approaches in health information exchange. One obvious approach is to link data using the 
identifiers in encrypted format, e.g., [29, 30, 31, 32]. An elegant approach to encrypt identifiers is 
using one way hash functions as in [31, 32].  To ensure security these methods are based on the 
irreversible transformation property of one way hash functions on identification data. These 
methods are vulnerable to some common cryptographic attacks. In [32] the authors propose a 
computerized hash encoding and anonymous record linkage procedure on medical information. To 
consolidate security against dictionary attack [32], two pads are used, one for the sender and the 
information and the other one for the recipient. Some other approaches have been proposed as well 
towards privacy preserving medical records linkage algorithms [33, 34]. A trusted third party has 
been used in [34] to make the algorithm more secure. Here each party is involved in computing the 
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set of bigrams for each string. Each party exchanges the power set of encrypted bigrams with the 
trusted third party and then string similarity is performed using Dice co-efficient. However these 
approaches usually have high false negative rates. Using indirect pseudonym identifiers [33], 
besides giving the patients control over what information is revealed about them, an architecture 
has been proposed to link medical records.  
Privacy preserving data matching algorithms have been proposed in database and data mining. In 
[28], the authors propose a solution where two parties can run data mining algorithms on the union 
of their own confidential databases, without revealing any unnecessary information. In this 
particular solution the authors focused on the problem of decision tree learning as the input sizes 
of data mining algorithms are huge and the data mining algorithms themselves are very complex. 
At each party’s end, this method uses a computation of the same order as computing the ID3 
algorithm on its own databases. It combines the result using cryptographic tools. Some solutions 
of privacy preserving record linkage are based on the perturbed information. For example, [35] 
uses randomizing functions such as the Gaussian function or Uniform perturbations to perturb the 
sensitive data and builds a decision tree classifier from these perturbed data. This solution offers a 
reconstruction procedure to accurately estimate the original data value distribution. The 
cryptographic technique which relies on the Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) Protocol [36] 
compute functions over private inputs. [37] proposes a more efficient protocol based on 
cryptographic techniques which preserves privacy of database schemas. Here the authors consider 
the scenario that two parties want to link their data in string format and can have different schemas. 
They propose a protocol which consists of a data matching protocol and a schema matching 
protocol. The protocol builds an embedding space and two parties embed their data strings using a 
variant of Sparse Map [38] ensuring the contractiveness of the embedding.  A semi-honest third 
party collects the embedded strings from the two parties and computes the similarities. Whereas 
[35] concentrates on exact matching, [37] focuses on approximate matching. A hybrid method that 
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combines both the data perturbation and cryptographic techniques is presented in [39]. The basic 
idea of this method is to first classify the data into two classes as matches and mismatches, and 
then apply the general SMC protocol to compute the distance for the records in the matches class. 
The problem with this method is that general SMC protocols are costly to use in practice. In [37, 
39] the proposed solutions use a trusted third party which is a major issue since a web-based trusted 
third party may not be a good choice to link records in a privacy preserving way.  
Some recent works [40, 41, 42, 43] focus on security and privacy in biological services and in 
medical data. By secure encapsulation and publishing of bioinformatics software in a cloud 
computing environment, the authors have derived a prototype system of the biological cloud in 
[40]. While they worked only on biological services and focused on achieving a prototype system 
of the biological cloud, our solution works on different databases and concentrates on linking these 
different databases in a privacy preserving manner. In [41], the authors have discussed medical data 
sharing by preserving privacy and data utility. They have given a clear picture about the data that 
generally is used for data sharing purposes, different techniques for privacy preserving data sharing 
and different types of threats. A new algorithm has been proposed in [43] for heterogeneous health 
data sharing in a privacy preserving manner. The proposed algorithm considers health data 
containing both relational and set-valued data and accomplishes ∈ - differential privacy. In [41] the 
authors have discussed different types of medical data, e.g., Demographics, Clinical Information, 
Text and Genomic Information and [43] works on heterogeneous medical data. In our solution, 
instead of different categories of medical data and heterogeneous health data we concentrate on 
textual and numeric data and further categorize them into error-free data and error-prone data. [42] 
focuses on privacy preserving interactive record linkage. The authors have given a solution by 
proposing a computer-based third-party record linkage platform, Secure Decoupled Linkage 
(SDLink). The proposed solution decouples the data, obfuscates it and shares minimum information 
via encryption, chaffing and recoding respectively, to ensure protection against attribute disclosure. 
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A new computer-based third-party record linkage platform has been proposed in [42] but our 
proposed solution does not need a trusted third party. 
Over the past few years biometric techniques have gained attention as a reliable means of 
authentication. Several authentication techniques based on different biometric traits, e.g., 
fingerprint, face, etc.  [56, 66, 67, 68, 69] have been proposed. A cryptographic privacy enhancing 
technology for face recognition has been proposed in [66]. A solution for two party problems [66] 
has been presented using the standard Eigen face recognition system, secure multiparty 
computation and Paillier encryption. In [56] the authors have proposed a privacy preserving 
protocol for fingerprint–based authentication using multiparty computation and homomorphic 
encryption. A privacy preserving cloud–based and cross–enterprise biometric identification with 
zero data disclosure possibility has been presented in [67]. Instead of using a distance based 
matching approach; this technique performs the identification process in an encrypted domain by 
creating encrypted search queries using a k–d tree structure. [68] presents a multimodal biometric 
authentication system using Commercial Off–the–Shelf (COTS) fingerprint and face images. A 
new normalization and fusion method have been introduced to accomplish match score level fusion 
of multimodal biometrics. In [69] the authors have proposed a robust multimodal authentication 
scheme integrating three biometric modalities: iris, face, and palm print with three different fusion 
strategies. 
Security is an important concern for cloud architecture as cloud storage is vulnerable to security 
threats. Protecting data storage and key management are two of the most important concerns. [70-
74] concentrate on cloud storage security and secure key management schemes in different cloud 
environments. Cloudstash [70] concentrates on providing the security of cloud storage. It considers 
the file as secret and applies secret sharing scheme directly on the multiple shares of secrets. This 
scheme hashes and signs each share of file and then distributes these signed multi shares into multi 
clouds. To overcome the limitations of a single domain cloud, a new second layer in the dependable 
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cloud computing stack named Intercloud has been introduced in [71, 113]. This scheme performs 
symmetric encryption on the data and splits the key into shares using a secret sharing scheme. It 
attaches the key shares as metadata to the pieces of data and distributes them to the clouds. The N 
cloud scheme [72] proposes an improved cloud storage scheme in terms of availability, 
performance and confidentiality in the cloud. It splits the file in many chunks and uploads the 
encrypted file chunks in geographically separated cloud storages in parallel. It also replicates the 
chunks in a non-overlapping manner into many cloud storages. To reconstruct the file it downloads 
the chunks, decrypts them and reassembles them back to a file. This technique manages the 
encryption keys at the client side and does not save them in the cloud. To overcome the limitation 
of a single cloud, the DepSky system [73] builds a cloud of clouds named Intercloud, on top of a 
set of storage clouds by using a combination of diverse commercial clouds. It uses the combination 
of Byzantine quorum system protocols, cryptographic secret sharing, erasure codes and diversity 
of several clouds to improve the availability and confidentiality provided by the commercial storage 
cloud. The CloudSeal scheme [74] provides an end to end content confidentiality protection 
mechanism for large scale content storage. It uses integrated symmetric encryption, threshold secret 
sharing, and a proxy based re-encryption scheme to protect the content and to manage user access. 
It also supports forward and backward security. Though many privacy preserving mechanisms have 
been proposed for the cloud environment, privacy preserving techniques in a distributed cloud has 
not been studied much. 
Mobile payments have gained popularity and we need to have an efficient, secure and privacy 
preserving payment protocol. There are many schemes for mobile payments which try to solve one 
of the issues such as efficiency, security or privacy with mobile payments. A secure account-based 
payment protocol [44] proposed for wireless networks, makes use of symmetric key properties 
which reduces computations. Their protocol increases transaction security compared to a SET [45] 
based approach. Use of a highly secure, multi-factor authentication scheme can be expensive in 
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mobile devices. In [46], the author has proposed a multi-factor security protocol for wireless 
payments for J2MEE based clients and J2EE based servers. This paper utilizes a TIC code and 
SMS to authenticate the transactions and assumes the mobile device which has the TIC codes is 
secure. The only security for applications provided is username and password. The rest of the 
payments transactions is based on TIC codes and SMS. S. Karnuskos et al [47], presented a secure 
mobile payment service as a part of the SEMPOS project which can handle security and privacy of 
users. The SEMPSO project makes use of mobile network operators and data centers to be part of 
the payment mechanism. In [48] the author utilizes a NFC based solution for managing payments. 
Since there are many parties involved for transactions, a cloud based approach is used. Secure 
elements which are attack resistant microcontroller are downloaded to the mobile device when a 
user wants to make payments and after user authorization, the transaction is executed and the secure 
elements are deleted from the device for security purposes. This architecture was envisioned to 
replace debit and credit cards in the future. The existing methods for mobile payments are device 
specific as in [46, 48]. In [46, 48] the payment technology can be applied only for devices with 
J2MEE and NFC enabled devices. Existing payment techniques such as NFC based solutions or 
google wallet are similar to traditional credit cards and are provided for ease of customer and are 
still prone to thefts and various attacks. 
This review shows that existing privacy preserving medical record linkage algorithms do not allow 
errors in data and uses  a trusted third party. In the  real world data errors in medical record is 
common. In our work we address these drawbacks by proposing a novel error tolerant record 
linkage algorithm which works on error–free and error–prone data and does not need a trusted third 
party. SLPMiner algorithm is one of the most efficient algorithms for sequential pattern mining 
algorithm [78] which is based on the PrefixSpan algorithm. Though many privacy preserving 
sequential pattern mining algorithms have been proposed, no research has been done on privacy 
preserving property of the SLPMiner algorithm. In our thesis dissertation we introduce the privacy 
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preserving property of the SLPMiner algorithm that can be applied across multiple medical sites.  
Key management and data protection are two important concerns in the cloud and distributed cloud 
environment. From our review it is evident that cloud storage and key management are vulnerable 
to security threats in a distributed cloud environment and has not been studied much. We propose 
novel privacy preserving schemes to protect data and the  secret key in a distributed cloud 
environment. Biometric authentication is a reliable technique to verify a genuine user. However 
biometrics is not secure when it is attacked by any determined adversary. In this thesis dissertation 
we propose a privacy preserving biometric authentication technique using the watermarking 
technique. We introduce a secure mobile payments scheme which uses our novel privacy 
preserving biometric authentication algorithm. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGNING AN ALGORITHM TO PRESERVE PRIVACY FOR MEDICAL RECORD 
LINKAGE WITH ERROR-PRONE DATA 
 
Linking medical records across different medical service providers is important to the enhancement 
of health care quality and public health surveillance. In records linkage, protecting patients privacy 
is a primary requirement. In real-world health care databases, records may contain errors due to 
various reasons such as typos. Linking the error-prone data and preserving data privacy at the same 
time are very difficult. Existing privacy preserving solutions for this problem are only restricted to 
textual data.  
3.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing works [52] do not meet all the requirements of medical record linkage all the time in 
practice. For instance in earlier work [29] on data record linkage, identifiers were transmitted in 
encrypted format. This does not allow any kind of error in identifiers, but this may happen 
frequently in real-cases. Spelling mistakes and typographical errors are very common in databases. 
Some researches [41, 42, 49, 50, 51] have focused on error-prone data and on missing data. In [42] 
the authors have proposed a solution to build cross-site records and link data for a particular patient 
as she moves between participating sites. They consider the hypothesis that most variation in names 
occur after the first two letters. The date of birth is considered to be one of the most reliable 
attributes. The composite identifier is generated based on real identifiers in such a way that the 
possibility of identifying a common patient is maximized. This composite identifier is the hashed 
string of the first two letters of the patient’s first name and last name plus
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their date of birth. Considering this composite identifier they have shown that it has a higher 
sensitivity rate compared to other identifiers, e.g., SSN and identifier based on patient’s full name 
and date of birth.  
Most of the existing algorithms for error- prone data are concentrated on textual data. They are very 
useful for linking records for any customer identifying information. Some approaches towards 
error-prone data in privacy preserving record linkage have been proposed. One of these proposed 
solutions uses Bloom Filters [49]. This solution applies Bloom Filters with Hash–based Message 
Authentication Code (HMACS) on q-grams of identifiers and allows errors in identifiers. 
Compared to other privacy preserving record linkage methods with encrypted string type identifiers 
these methods have lower false negative rates. However, the existing proposed solutions of this 
category are designed for textual data.  On the other hand privacy preserving record linkage for 
error-prone numeric data is also very important. For instance, medical records usually contain 
ample numerical attributes, such as the patient’s blood pressure, height, weight, and other test 
results. In different medical databases, medical data may be stored at different precisions. Then 
even two very close numbers (e.g., 392.1 and 392.11) may cause a totally negative linking result.  
The consequence of high false negative results may be very harmful, especially when querying a 
patient’s records for emergency treatments.  
 
Figure 4: Privacy Preserving Record Linkage Problem 
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In this work we aim to address the privacy preserving record linkage problem with the presence 
of error-prone data. In Fig. 4, we illustrate an example of a real world case where privacy 
preserving record linkage for error-prone data is needed. In this figure, each of the two hospitals 
have their own database of patients’ information. They want to find out the common patients 
they share (e.g., Angel Smith and Divine Scavo) in order to share information about the patients. 
However, due to HIPAA requirements, they cannot exchange data in clear texts. Moreover, we 
notice that for patient Divine Scavo, all attributes are the same at both hospitals except the 
height (one is 162.5 cm and the other is 162.6 cm). If traditional cryptographic schemes are 
used, the record belonging to the same patient will be labeled as a mismatch, leading to an error 
result. In order to avoid the mismatch for the records belonging to the same patient, we need 
new software to enable privacy preserving record linkage for error-prone data. Such work has 
not been reported in the literature.  
3.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
Assume the privacy preserving record linkage takes place between two medical organizations. Each 
organization holds information about its entities, e.g., patients/customers. Along with the different 
entities both of these organizations have some common entities too. It is very difficult to get the 
data of only these common entities from the entire dataset of two organizations and preserving 
privacy at the same time. 
For example, suppose privacy preserving record linkage takes place between two hospitals, 
Hospital A and Hospital B. Each of these hospitals maintains detail information about patients, such 
as, patient’s name, date of birth, address, SSN, sex, etc. as shown in Fig. 5. Hospital A has four 
patients, Angel Smith, Divine Scavo, Selene Paul and Sandrine Pal and Hospital B has four patients, 
Angel Smith, Divine Scavo, Ryan Solis and Katie Gomes. All the information of patient Angel Smith 
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in Hospital A matches with the patient Angel Smith in Hospital B. Some of the information, i.e., 
name, address, SSN, age and sex of patient Divine Scavo in Hospital A matches with patient Divine 
Scavo in Hospital B. Assume that Hospital A takes the initiative of record linkage and Hospital B 
is the participating organization as it participates in the record linkage. (We use the terms initiating 
organization and participating organization in this chapter.) During this entire procedure it is 
implicit that Hospital B agrees to share its patients database with Hospital A without revealing any 
sensitive information about the patients. Hospital A will get Angel Smith as matched data, Divine 
Scavo as partially matched data and Selene Paul and Sandrine Pal as mismatched data. Matched 
data means that the data Hospital A and Hospital B match, mismatched data means data that belongs 
to Hospital A and Hospital B do not match and partially matched data means data for an entity of 
which some of the attributes match at both hospital ends. 
 
Figure 5: Data from two hospitals 
 
Errors in database data are common. Therefore privacy preserving record linkage for error-prone 
data is necessary. For error-prone numerical data we can formulate the problem as follows. We 
assume that for any client, the common part of her records stored in both entities has 𝑛 attributes. 
The goal of the linkage is to find out the records held by party B that are within a small distance (or 
very close) to the record hold by party A. Formally, the problem for error-prone data (i.e., privacy 
preserving error-tolerant linkage) is defined as follows. Given two databases 𝐷𝐴 (𝑎1, 𝑎2, … . . , 𝑎𝑚) 
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and 𝐷𝐵 (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … . . , 𝑏𝑚) with the same attributes where 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 is the record in database 𝐷𝐴 and 
𝐷𝐵 respectively. The error-tolerant linkage function takes a tuple < 𝑎, 𝐷𝐴, τ > as input, where 𝑎 is 
any record in 𝐷𝐴 and τ is the distance threshold and outputs a vector of boolean numbers, (r1, r2,·
 · ·, rm), where ∀𝑖 s.t., 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, 
𝑟𝑖        =                   {   
1   𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖) ≤  τ 
0              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
            (1) 
in which 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(i, j) is the distance function defined for input records between database records i and 
j. The Euclidean distance function is used in our work. Privacy preserving error-tolerant linkage 
guarantees that computing the error-tolerant linkage function is secure in the semi-honest model 
[27, 28], without a trusted third party. 
By being secure in the semi-honest model, the two parties (or any other adversary) cannot 
efficiently obtain more information than the input and the output of the algorithm. In particular, for 
our error-tolerant linking algorithm, the two parties will know only the output (r1, r2,· · ·, rm) and 
no information about the values of records (either linked or not-linked) will be revealed. 
3.3. SCHEMES 
 
The main goal of our approach is that if the participating organization sends the entire dataset as 
encrypted format to the initiating organization then it is not possible for any other third party as 
well as the initiating organization to know the data values or data fields of the participating 
organization if the key-pair is unknown. In our proposed solution, to send data confidentially to the 
other party we considered three cryptographic schemes, i.e., SHA-1, SHA-2 and Error-Tolerant 
Linking Algorithm.  Before discussing the schemes in detail we categorize the data into two 
different data categories: error-free data and the error-prone data. SHA-1, and SHA-2 are basic 
cryptographic schemes for privacy preserving error-free data linkage and the Error-Tolerant 
Linking Algorithm is for error-prone data.  
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The workflow of our scheme is as follows. To encrypt the data, the initiating organization chooses 
a dataset name and cryptographic scheme and sends both of them to the participating organization. 
If the participating organization holds the same dataset it starts the privacy preserving data linkage 
process by encrypting the data using the cryptographic scheme send to it by the initiating org. It 
sends data in cipher text format to the initiating organization. Meanwhile the initiating organization 
encrypts its own dataset by using the cryptographic scheme. After receiving data the initiating 
organization applies the privacy preserving matching scheme to obtain the results, i.e., to determine 
if the data sets match, mismatch and or partially match. The workflow of the solution is shown in 
Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6: Overall flow of the solution 
 
We will discuss about the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm in detail and two existing 
cryptographic schemes briefly in the following two subsections respectively. 
3.3.1. SCHEME FOR ERROR-PRONE DATA 
 
We propose a new solution for the error-prone data, named an Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm. 
The Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm uses the ElGamal[4] scheme as the basic building block. In 
this subsection, we review the ElGamal scheme first and then will describe the Error–Tolerant 
Linking Algorithm in detail.  ElGamal is a public key encryption scheme. Let 𝐺 be a cyclic group 
of prime order 𝑝 with generator 𝑔. A value  𝑥 ∈  𝑍𝑝 is randomly chosen as the private key. The 
corresponding public key is (𝑝, 𝑔, ℎ), where h =  𝑔𝑥. To encrypt the message 𝑚, a value r ∈  𝑍𝑝 
29 
is randomly chosen. Then the cipher text is 𝐸(𝑚) = (𝐶1, 𝐶2) = (𝑔
𝑟, 𝑚. ℎ𝑟). (We use 𝐸(𝑚)  to 
denote the ciphertext of 𝑚 encrypted by ElGamal scheme.) The decryption is as follows. 
         
𝐶2
𝐶1
𝑥 = 
𝑚.ℎ𝑟
𝑔𝑥.𝑟
 = 
𝑚.ℎ𝑟
ℎ𝑟
 = 𝑚                                              (2) 
The Difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields forms the basis for security in 
ElGamal. To decrypt a cipher text any adversary would have to get the one time random integer. 
Determining this random integer is infeasible as it requires computing of discrete logarithms.  
Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm exploits the homomorphic property of the ElGamal scheme. 
That is, for two messages 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 it satisfies the following property:  
                                                𝐸( 𝑚1. 𝑚2) = 𝐸(𝑚1). 𝐸(𝑚2)                                                    (3) 
In addition to linking the data from two different organizations, the Error-Tolerant Linking 
Algorithm preserves privacy as well. We assume that the attributes of records are preprocessed and 
converted to integers beforehand. For numerical attributes, this preprocessing is straightforward by 
normalizing the original values to integers within a certain range. For attributes consisting of 
strings, we can use a preprocessing method to convert the strings into integers so that the integers 
can still keep the distance between the records. Our algorithm is applied afterwards to complete the 
records linkage. This algorithm allows the input record with minor deviations less than a small 
threshold τ.  The threshold value is to calculate the distance between the identifiers of two records. 
In this algorithm, neither entity can learn the records of the other’s patients.   
Algorithm 3.1 shows the details of our privacy-preserving Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm. First, 
party A generates a pair of keys for ElGamal scheme and sends the public key to party B. For each 
attribute 𝑎[𝑗] in the record, party A computes 𝑔𝑎[𝑗] and  𝑔((𝑎[𝑗])
2) , and sends the cipher texts of 
these terms to party B. For each record 𝑏𝑖  held by B, B computes 𝑔
((𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2) for each attribute 𝑏𝑖[𝑗], 
and encrypts them using the public key received from A. Then party B computes C as shown in 
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Line 11 in Algorithm 1. After receiving the product from B, party A decrypts it using the private 
key and obtains a decrypted value 𝐷(𝐶). If 𝐷(𝐶)equals any number in (𝑔0, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, … … . , 𝑔τ), it 
means that ∑ (𝑎[𝑘] − 𝑏𝑖[𝑘])
2𝑛
𝑘=1  ≤  τ , and thus we say it is a linking case. Otherwise, we say 
record 𝑏𝑖  does not link 𝑎. The Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm is correct. We discuss the 
correctness analysis of the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm in the sub-subsection named 
Correctness Analysis of Analysis subsection. 
3.3.1.1. ALGORITHM 
 
INPUT: Party A holds a record(𝑎[1], 𝑎[2], . . . . . , 𝑎[𝑛]). Party B holds a database of 𝑚 records, 
and each record in B is of this form: 𝑏𝑖 : (𝑏𝑖[1],  𝑏𝑖[2], … . , 𝑏𝑖[𝑚]) where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 ; the distance 
threshold is  τ. 
OUTPUT: Linking result for each record held by B: [r1, r2,· · ·, rm], where r𝑖 = 1  or r𝑖 = 0 , 
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚. 
1. Party A generates a pair of public key (p, g, h) and private key 𝑥 for ElGamal scheme and 
sends (p, g, h) to B. 
2. for j= 1 to 𝑛 do 
3.     A computes 𝑔𝑎[𝑗] and encrypts 𝑔𝑎[𝑗], obtaining 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗]). 
4. end for 
5. A computes 𝐸(𝑔(𝑎[1])
2
),  𝐸(𝑔(𝑎[2])
2
), ………., 𝐸(𝑔(𝑎[𝑛])
2
) and sends them together with 
𝐸(𝑔𝑎[1]), 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[2]), …., 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑛]) to B. 
6. for  i = 1 to n do 
7.        r𝑖 = 0 
8.        for j = 1 to m do 
9.           B computes 𝑔((𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2) and encrypts 𝑔((𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2) , obtaining E (𝑔((𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2)). 
10.        end for 
11.       B computes ∏ 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗]
2
) 𝐸(𝑔(𝑏𝑖[𝑗]
2))𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗])−2𝑏𝑖[𝑗]𝑛𝑗=1  and sends it to A. 
12.       A decrypts C using private key 𝑥, and obtains 𝐷(𝐶) = 𝑔∑ (𝑎[𝑗]−𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1 . 
13.       for k = 1 to τ 
14.           if 𝐷(𝐶) = gk  then  
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15.                Output result r𝑖 = 1  . 
16.                break 
17.           end if  
18.       end for 
19. end for 
Algorithm 3.1: Error- Tolerant Linking Algorithm 
 
3.3.2. SCHEMES FOR ERROR-FREE DATA 
For the regular error-free data we considered two existing basic cryptographic schemes: SHA-1 
and SHA-2. SHA-1[141] and SHA-2[141] comes under the hash algorithm family. In this 
subsection we will review Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) briefly. SHA is based on the design 
principle of MD4 [142].  Both of these algorithms are iterative and one way hash functions. SHA-
1 and SHA-2 consist of two major steps: preprocessing and hash computation. In the preprocessing 
step, every input message is padded and then split into fixed size message blocks and the working 
variables are initialized to be used in hash computation. The hash computation consists of an 80–
step compression function which iteratively generates hash values  ℎ𝑖, i.e., the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ  hash value. The 
80–step compression function is applied to each of the message blocks. Generally two types of 
inputs are considered here: chaining input and message. If the message is m and chaining input is 
ℎ𝑖 then the compression function is 𝑔(𝑚, ℎ𝑖) at the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ stage. The chaining input at the (𝑖 + 1)𝑡ℎ 
stage, ℎ(𝑖+1) is calculated by ℎ𝑖 + 𝑔(𝑚, ℎ𝑖).  The value of the compression function at the last stage 
is the hash value of the message. SHA-1 and SHA-2 differ in terms of the message size, block size, 
word size, and message digest size as given in Table 1. 
In SHA-1 five working variables: a, b, c, d, e are used. The message is represented by 16 32-bit 
words, denoted by 𝑀𝑖. The message is then expanded to 80 32-bit words 𝑊𝑖 . The expanded 
message 𝑊𝑖 can be defined as follows: 
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𝑊𝑖    =    {  
𝑀𝑖                                                                                   𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 15
𝑊𝑖−3 ⊕ 𝑊𝑖−8 ⊕ 𝑊𝑖−14 ⊕ 𝑊𝑖−16                             𝑓𝑜𝑟 16 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 79
                   (4) 
Here ⊕ denotes addition modulo 232.  
Secure Hash 
Algorithm Name 
Message Size 
(bits) 
Block Size 
(bits) 
Word 
Size(bits) 
Message Digest 
Size (bits) 
SHA-1 < 264 512 32 160 
SHA-2 < 2128 1024 64 512 
Table 1: SHA-1 and SHA-2 properties 
 
Next working variables are initialized and computes the 80–step compression function and 
intermediate hash values. If there are n message blocks, i.e.,  𝑀1, 𝑀2, … . . , 𝑀𝑛 then the entire 
procedure is repeated for n number of times. The resulting 160–bit message digest of the message, 
M is, 
                                        𝐻0
(𝑁)
∥ 𝐻1
(𝑁)
∥ 𝐻2
(𝑁)
∥ 𝐻3
(𝑁)
∥ 𝐻4
(𝑁)
                                                    (5) 
Here,  𝐻𝑗
(𝑖)
 means the 𝑗𝑡ℎ word of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ hash value. The procedure of SHA-2 is similar to SHA-
1. It first pads the message and divides it into 64-bit message blocks. The number of working 
variables here are eight, i.e., a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h. After initializing the working variables and 
computing the 80–step compression function and intermediate hash values it generates a 512–bit 
message digest of the message M. The final message digest of M is,  
                            𝐻0
(𝑁)
∥ 𝐻1
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻2
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻3
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻4
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻5
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻6
(𝑁) ∥ 𝐻7
(𝑁)                                    (6) 
SHA-1 and SHA-2 are considered here since it is easy to compute the hash value of any given 
message and they are the one-way hash functions, i.e., they have One – way, Second preimage 
resistant and Collision resistant properties. SHA-1 and SHA-2 produces 160-bit and 512-bit hash 
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values respectively for any given message. Therefore for any given message there are 2160 and 2512 
possible hash values. It is very difficult to identify the actual message from this vast range of hash 
values. Here in our system after applying SHA-1 and SHA-2 on the data we get the message 
digest/encrypted data from both of the parties and apply our data matching technique on those 
encrypted data.  
3.4. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
 
We analyze our schemes especially the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm in terms of correctness, 
privacy and complexity.  
3.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
For the proof of correctness, if the two parties follow Algorithm 1, they will jointly compute the 
correct Euclidean distance without each party knowing the record from the other party. The 
homomorphic property of ElGamal scheme helps to prove line 12 in Algorithm 3.1.  
𝐷(𝐶) 
=  𝐷( ∏ 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗]
2
) 𝐸(𝑔(𝑏𝑖[𝑗]
2))𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗])−2𝑏𝑖[𝑗] )𝑛𝑗=1  
= 𝐷(𝐸( ∏ 𝑔(𝑎[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1  𝑔
(𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2
 ) ∏ 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑗])−2𝑏𝑖[𝑗] ))𝑛𝑗=1   
= 𝐷(𝐸( ∏ 𝑔(𝑎[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑔
(𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2
) 𝐸(∏ (𝑔−2𝑎[𝑗]𝑏𝑖[𝑗])𝑛𝑗=1 ) 
= 𝐷(𝐸( ∏ 𝑔(𝑎[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑔
(𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2
∏ (𝑔−2𝑎[𝑗]𝑏𝑖[𝑗])𝑛𝑗=1 ) 
= 𝐷(𝐸( ∏ 𝑔(𝑎[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑔
(𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2
𝑔−2𝑎[𝑗]𝑏𝑖[𝑗])) 
= 𝐷(𝐸(𝑔∑ (𝑎[𝑗]−𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1 )) 
= 𝑔∑ (𝑎[𝑗]−𝑏𝑖[𝑗])
2𝑛
𝑗=1  
34 
If (𝐶) =  𝑔𝑘, where 𝑘 ≤  τ means that  ∑ (𝑎[𝑘] − 𝑏𝑖[𝑘])
2𝑛
𝑘=1  ≤  τ . Then we can say that record 
𝑎 is within the distance of  τ, from record 𝑏𝑖, and the result of error-tolerant linking is positive. 
3.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
 
In this subsection, we explain why the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm is secure (i.e., privacy 
preserving) in the semi-honest model. Being secure in the semi-honest model means neither of the 
two parties can learn more than the output of the algorithm from the information received during 
the algorithm. In Algorithm 3.1, the only message received by B is the cipher texts 
𝐸(𝑔((𝑎[1])
2)),𝐸(𝑔((𝑎[2])
2)), … . , 𝐸(𝑔((𝑎[𝑛])
2)), and 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[1]), 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[2]), …., 𝐸(𝑔𝑎[𝑛]). Since 
ElGamal scheme is semantically secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [25], party 
B cannot learn anything about 𝑔((𝑎[1])
2),𝑔((𝑎[2])
2), · · ·𝑔((𝑎[𝑛])
2), 𝑔𝑎[1] , 𝑔𝑎[2], · · · 𝑔𝑎[𝑛]  but the 
cipher texts. For party A, the message it receives from party B is C. From the semantic security of 
ElGamal scheme, party A cannot learn the clear texts from party B but the 𝐷(𝐶). Here we note that 
𝐷(𝐶) and ∑ (𝑎[𝑘] − 𝑏𝑖[𝑘])
2𝑛
𝑘=1  can be derived from the output of the algorithm by trying different 
numbers in a small range of τ. Therefore, we say that A knowing 𝐷(𝐶) and ∑ (𝑎[𝑘] −𝑛𝑘=1
𝑏𝑖[𝑘])
2 does not violate the security requirement and party A can send these values to party B if 
needed. 
3.4.3. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
 
We analyze the computational cost of our algorithm on party A and party B respectively. The 
computational cost of party A includes computing 2𝑛 exponentiations, 2𝑛 encryptions, and 1 
decryption. Suppose that the each exponentiation takes time 𝑇𝑒. Then the total computation cost of 
party A is 2𝑛(𝑇𝑒 + 𝑇𝐸) + 𝑇𝐷, where  𝑇𝐸 is the time to perform one ElGamal encryption and 𝑇𝐷 is 
the time to perform one decryption. Values of 𝑔𝑘  can be computed beforehand and saved in a table 
for reference at line 14, Algorithm 3.1. Party B needs to compute 2𝑛𝑚 exponentiations, 𝑛𝑚 
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encryptions, 2𝑛𝑚 divisions/ multiplications. So the computation cost for party B is 
𝑛𝑚(2𝑇𝑒 + 𝑇𝐸 + 2𝑇𝑚), where 𝑇𝑚 is the time for a multiplication and the definitions of 𝑇𝑒, 𝑇𝐸 are 
as above. When there are k records in party A to be linked with the records held by party B, the total 
computation time at party A is  𝑛𝑚(2𝑇𝑒 + 𝑇𝐸) +  2𝑛𝑚𝑘 ×  𝑇𝑚. Note that in the computation 
cost, 𝑛𝑚(2𝑇𝑒 + 𝑇𝐸) is not multiplied by 𝑘, because as long as party A does not change his public 
key, the cipher texts of party B’s record do not change and thus they only need to be computed 
once. 
3.5. RESULTS 
3.5.1. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
This subsection explains the system implementation of record linkage for healthcare data. We 
implement our system using the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment (IDE). We have 
used the programming language Java. The entire system is divided into three modules: Connection 
Management Module, Data Matching Module, and Matching Record Management Module. 
Among these three modules the main module is Data Matching Module. The solution of the privacy 
preserving record linkage, i.e., Data Matching Module works for both of the error-free data and 
error-prone numerical data. The Matching Record Management Module shows the result/records 
from the recent past data matching attempts and the Connection Management Module takes care 
of creating the connection with the collaborator. We will discuss these three modules in more detail 
in the following subsections. The snapshot of selecting a function/module in our system is given in 
Fig. 7. 
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Figure 7: Snapshot of selecting a module 
 
3.5.1.1. CONNECTION MANAGEMENT MODULE 
Each party/organization keeps a list of available and reachable collaborators. To create a connection 
with another party/collaborator, each party needs to select that particular collaborator from the 
collaborator list. The snapshot of how a user selects a collaborator in our system is given in Fig. 8.  
 
Figure 8: Snapshot of selecting a collaborator 
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To initialize the connection each and every organization keeps some initial information about the 
other collaborators. This information contains the IP address, port number, public-key private-key 
pair etc. Party A first selects the party B from the available participating collaborator list. Party A 
uses the corresponding IP address and port number of the party B for creating the connection. We 
follow the client–server architecture to implement our system. The communication between two 
parties is realized by socket API. Party B (server) creates a socket to listen requests from party A 
(client). Party B can handle more than one client at a time. If there is more than one client, party B 
creates separate sockets using multi-threading for each of the requesting clients.  
3.5.1.2. DATA MATCHING MODULE  
The Data Matching Module is the main module of our system. We consider two parties: party A 
and party B. Party A initiates the matching procedure and party B takes part in this matching 
procedure. The entire work flow of the system including party A and party B is illustrated in Fig. 
9. As shown in Fig. 9, once a connection is created between party A and party B, data transfer 
between the two parties and matching can take place. Party A first selects the record set for 
matching data.  When party A selects the dataset name then the corresponding attributes list 
becomes available. Party A selects the attributes names and sends the dataset name along with the 
attributes to party B. Party B searches the requested record set in its set of record sets. If party B 
has the record set, it sends an acknowledgement to the party A. In response to this 
acknowledgement, party A sends the user selected cryptographic scheme name to party B and 
encrypts its own selected record set. Party B encrypts the requested dataset with the requested 
cryptographic scheme. A snapshot of how a user selects a cryptographic scheme is given in Fig. 
10. For encryption purposes, the Java Cryptography Library is used. To encrypt data we considered 
three cryptographic schemes: SHA-1, SHA-2, and Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithms. The first 
two schemes SHA-1, SHA-2 do not require any key pair whereas the Error-Tolerant Linking 
Algorithm needs key pair for encryption. The key pair will be known to the organization and its 
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collaborator beforehand. The first two schemes, SHA-1 and SHA-2 work in the same way.  After 
encrypting the record set, party B sends the encrypted data to party A. After receiving the encrypted 
data from party B, party A applies the data matching technique on these two encrypted record sets. 
 
 
Figure 9: The work flow of the system 
 
The Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm works a little differently than the other two cryptographic 
schemes, once the dataset name and attributes has been selected. Suppose party A has one medical 
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record to be linked with the records held by party B. The flow can be easily extended to the case 
where A has multiple medical records to be linked, A send the encrypted messages generated by 
his data record to be linked to party B. Then B handles the encrypted messages as described in 
previous sections (i.e., encrypting his own data record and multiplying their inverse with A’s 
message) and sends the multiplied encrypted message back to A. A decrypts the message and 
outputs the linking result. Party B moves to the next record and repeats the linking procedure. Party 
A does not need to encrypt his record again but only needs to decrypt the messages sent from B 
and output the linking result. This repeating process carries on until party B has gone through all 
his records. Then party A and party B close the connection with each other and the privacy 
preserving linkage is completed. 
 
Figure 10: Snapshot of selecting an encryption scheme 
           
 
The flow of the Error Tolerant Linking Algorithm after selecting the dataset name and attributes 
is depicted in Fig. 11. Once the entire data matching procedure is completed, the 
client/initiating organization closes the connection with the server/participating organization 
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automatically. As a result of the entire data matching procedure, party A gets the matched, 
mismatched and partially matched result with party B. Fig. 12 shows a snapshot of matching 
result of our system 
 
Figure 11: Flow of Error Tolerant Linking Algorithm between two parties when they are already 
connected and the dataset name, attributes are known to party B 
 
3.5.1.3. MATCHING RECORD MANAGEMENT MODULE 
 
The Matching Record Management Module shows a brief description of the matching result from 
the recent past data matching attempts. It shows the date-time of when the matching took place, 
name of the participating organization/collaborator, name of the record set, the number of matched, 
mismatched and partially matched data for each and every data matching attempt. A snapshot of 
Matching Record Management Module of our system is given in Fig. 13. 
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Figure 12: Snapshot of showing matching result in our system 
 
 
Figure 13: Matching Record Management Module 
 
3.5.2.  EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
We ran our system on two computers with 3.33 GHz Intel Core i5 processor, 4 GB RAM, 64 bit 
operating system. Both for party A and party B, we have constructed window applications using 
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Java. The applications on the different computers are connected by the Internet. The 
communication between party A and party B is realized by using socket API. Before running the 
system each client needs to know the IP address and port number of the server. If a party/server 
changes its IP address then it should inform the other parties/clients. We consider that each party 
maintains an IP address and port list of other parties. 
We use two real-world medical datasets, the Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set and the Heart Disease 
Data Set [59] to implement our system. To handle these real-world datasets MySQL is used. Java 
Database Connectivity (JDBC) connects the application front end to the database end. JDBC is 
used to access data directly from the database and to display them to the user.  
3.5.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
We test the scalability of our system in terms of time efficiency. For each cryptographic scheme in 
this system we vary the number of records and the number of attributes for each record, and then 
measure the computation time of our system. To test the efficiency of our system, we consider two 
real-world datasets, the Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set and the Heart Disease Data Set [24]. In the 
Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set we use at most eight attributes: (1) Number of times pregnant, (2) 
Plasma Glucose Concentration; a 2 hours in an oral glucose tolerance test, (3) Diastolic blood 
pressure (mm Hg), (4) Triceps skin fold thickness (mm), (5) 2-hours serum insulin (mm U/ ml), (6) 
Body mass index (weight in kg/(height in m)2), (7) Diabetes pedigree function, (8) Age (years). 
Similarly for the Heart Disease Data Set, we use eight attributes for each record: (1) age of the 
patient, (2) sex, (3) chest pain type, (4) resting blood pressure, (5) serum cholesterol in mg/dl, (6) 
fasting blood sugar, (7) resting electrocardiographic results (8) maximum heart rate achieved. For 
each encryption scheme except the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm we vary only the number of 
attributes to four, six and eight and use 100 patients’ records. For the Error-Tolerant Linking 
Algorithm we vary the number of attributes as well as the number of patients’ records.  
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For SHA-1 and SHA-2 we use 100 patients’ records from both the Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set 
and the Heart Disease Data Set. For each record we vary the number of attributes to four, six and 
eight. We show the computation times of our system using SHA-1 and SHA-2 in Fig. 14 and Fig. 
15 respectively. For both of these above mentioned existing algorithms the computation time 
increases as we increase the number of attributes. The computation time grows almost linearly as 
we increase the number of attributes. Moreover, in every case the computation time does not go 
beyond 0.1 second.  
 
Figure 14: Computation time for SHA -1 for 100 records with varying number  
of  attributes of four, six and eight. 
 
 
Figure 15: Computation time for SHA -2 for 100 records with varying number of attributes of 
four, six and eight.
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Figures 16 and 17 depict the computation time for the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm.  We 
implement the Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm with both constant and varying number of 
attributes. The values of all the attributes are preprocessed and converted to integers. Fig. 16 shows 
the computation time of our system when party A conducts the privacy preserving linking on Pima 
Indians Diabetes Data Set. Party B holds a variable number of records of 100, 200 and 300 while 
keeping the number of attributes constant at four. The computation time increases linearly as the 
size of data to be linked grows. Fig. 17 presents the computation time for Heart Disease Data Set 
with varying number of records from 100 to 300 and varying number of attributes from 4 to 8. For 
this data set too, the computation time increases as the number of attributes and number of records 
grow. In both cases, when the number of records or number of attributes increases the computation 
time increases almost linearly. In addition to that, for this algorithm too the computation times 
never go beyond 0.1 second.  
 
Figure 16: Computation time for Error –Tolerant Linking Algorithm with varying patients’ 
records from Pima Indians Diabetes Data Set where each record has 4 attributes 
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Figure 17: Computation time for Error-Tolerant Linking Algorithm with varying  patients’ 
records and varying attributes from Heart Disease Data Set 
 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we propose a solution for privacy preserving record linkage for error-free data as 
well as for error-prone data. For error-free data, we offer two existing cryptographic schemes: (1) 
SHA-1, and (2) SHA-2. A new algorithm is proposed for error-prone numeric data. We 
implemented our system fully and tested it on two real-world data sets. We have shown that our 
system is secure, correct, and efficient and does not require a trusted third party. The experimental 
results demonstrate the efficiency of our system. The one limitation of our proposed system is that 
for error-prone data our system is limited to only numeric data. Considering this fact, we designed 
our software in such a way that any existing solution for error-prone textual data can be easily 
integrated into our system. This makes our software flexible and open to integrate any existing 
record linkage scheme for error-prone textual data. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRIVACY PRESERVING SEQUENTIAL PATTERN MINING ACROSS MULTIPLE 
MEDICAL SITES 
 
4.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Data mining investigates data for unknown, hidden, predictive patterns and trends from large 
volumes of data.  Over the past decade data mining research has led to the development of various 
algorithms such as clustering, classification, association rule mining etc. One of the important 
sequence data mining problems, sequence Pattern Mining discovers frequent sequential patterns in 
large sequential databases. Sequential frequent pattern mining methods are applicable in a large 
number of applications and domains, such as analysis of DNA sequences, patterns in patient path, 
disease treatments, analysis of customer purchase patterns, web access patterns, discovering trends 
in marketing and sales data etc.  
For the last ten years various algorithms (e.g., [75-79]) have been developed to find sequential 
patterns in very large sequential databases. These large varieties of algorithms encompass mining 
frequent sequential patterns, closed sequential patterns, compressing sequential patterns, maximal 
sequential patterns, sequential generator patterns etc. from sequence database. The basic feature of 
most sequential pattern mining algorithms [75] is to find all frequent subsequences from a given 
set of sequences where each sequence consists of a list of elements and each element consists of a 
set of items. A user-specified minimum support threshold is also used as a threshold value to find 
the frequent subsequences. The frequent subsequences are those whose occurrence frequency in 
the set of sequences is no less than minimum support threshold. [75, 76, 77, 80] 
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algorithms generate constant–support–based frequent patterns which generate an exponentially 
large number of short patterns. Finding all frequent patterns which support length–decreasing 
support constraint is desirable as long patterns tend to be interesting with small support and short 
patterns tend to be interesting with high support. SLPMiner [81] is such an algorithm that finds all 
frequent sequential patterns that satisfy the length–decreasing support constraint. 
On the other hand, preserving privacy is a real concern in many data mining problems. Data mining 
involves both extracting patterns and trends from large databases and sharing of information [82]. 
Databases contain sensitive information which leads to mining of sensitive data by applying data 
mining algorithms [83, 84]. As a result, the privacy of sensitive data may be compromised when 
private information is disclosed publicly or shared. Privacy preserving data mining involves the 
development of data mining algorithms that modify private data in such a way so that even after 
mining, private data remains always private. One of the different techniques that can be used to 
modify private data is using a cryptography based technique. Several privacy preserving sequential 
pattern mining algorithms [84-87] have been developed to mine sequence data. In [84] the authors 
proposed PriPSep algorithm which is a novel secure extension of the S-step process of the SPAM 
[78] algorithm. Compared to SPADE, SPAM uses a space inefficient approach. To mine sequential 
patterns, PrefixSpan [77] and SPADE [79] are the two fastest algorithms [78]. The database 
projection based approach of the SLPMiner [81] algorithm is based on the sequential version of 
[89] which shares the same overall structure of the PrefixSpan algorithm. The pruning methods 
proposed in the SLPMiner algorithm and the length decreasing support constraint make this 
algorithm more efficient and enable its high performance.  
Finding frequent patterns and trends by exploring large databases is the main task of data mining. 
Sequential pattern mining is one of the important sequence data mining problems with numerous 
applications. Sequential pattern mining discovers the frequent subsequences as patterns from 
sequence databases. Numerous algorithms [77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 92, 93] have been developed to find 
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such patterns efficiently. The sequence pattern mining problem was first introduced by Agrawal 
and Srikant [75]. To discover generalized sequential patterns, the GSP algorithm [76] was 
proposed. In [77] the authors proposed an efficient pattern–grown method named PrefixSpan which 
grow sequential patterns in each projected sequence database. The PrefixSpan approach uses the 
pseudo projection technique to reduce the number of physical projected databases. An efficient 
algorithm SPAM [78] finds all frequent sequences in a list of transactions using a depth–first search 
strategy combined with a vertical bitmap representation. Here the depth–first search strategy 
integrates the depth–first traversal of the search space with effective pruning mechanisms.  A fast 
sequential pattern mining algorithm, SPADE decomposes the original problem into smaller sub–
problems using combinatorial properties. The sub–problems can be solved independently in main 
memory using efficient lattice search techniques and simple join operations. An efficient sequential 
pattern mining algorithm named LAPIN has been proposed in [91] which is based on the last 
position induction of the items. The SLPMiner algorithm [81] finds all sequential patterns that 
satisfy a length–decreasing support constraint.  To reduce the search space this algorithm combines 
an efficient database–projection–based approach with three database pruning methods. 
Considering the presence of private sensitive information in the sequence databases, privacy is a 
concern in sequential pattern mining. Several algorithms [83-86] have been proposed for privacy 
preserving sequential pattern mining. A privacy preserving sequential pattern mining algorithm 
named PRIPSEP [10] has been proposed for secure multi–party computation. [84] introduces a 
privacy preserving sequential pattern mining algorithm based on secure multi–party computation 
and homomorphic encryption scheme. It discovers the sequential patterns collaboratively and 
privately on the union of the private data sets held by the multiple parties. [85] presents a privacy 
preserving index based sequential pattern mining algorithm SSAP which uses an equivalent form 
of a sequential pattern to reduce the cryptographic operations, such as encryption and decryption. 
A privacy preserving collaborative sequential pattern mining algorithm has been introduced in [86]. 
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[94] presents the way to mine frequent pattern with differential privacy. However, there has not 
been any research on providing a privacy preserving property for the SLPMiner algorithm. 
4.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
We focus on identifying the most frequent sequential patterns on sequence databases over multiple 
parties in a privacy preserving manner. The motivation behind this work is to extract the common, 
most frequent sequential patterns from multiple sites in a privacy preserving manner. For sequential 
pattern mining we use the SLPMiner algorithm because of its high performance and efficiency. Our 
proposed scheme can be applied to the healthcare industries to identify the patterns in patient path, 
patient health, disease, medication etc. as it involves multiple parties and needs to be done in a 
privacy preserving manner.  
 
Figure 18: Overview of the scenario 
 
As a real life scenario, to analyze effective treatment methods of different diabetic patients (grouped 
by ages) it is essential to collect correlated patients’ data from different medical sources. According 
to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1], sharing any patient data 
violates privacy and should not be disclosed. Therefore we need a privacy preserving mechanism 
to analyze patients’ records from different medical sources. The result of the analysis will show the 
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different age groups and effective treatment methods of diabetic patients. For this study, say 2 
hospitals are involved. Fig. 18 shows the overall view of the scenario. Out of the collective data 
patterns of different patients from these two hospitals, the task is to get the most frequent patterns 
of patients age groups, treatment methods. The pattern can be represented as   <
𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑 >. Fig. 19 shows the databases  𝐷𝐴,  𝐷𝐵 from   𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴 and 
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵 respectively.   
 
Figure 19: Patient Databases from two hospitals 
 
From database 𝐷𝐴 the most frequent pattern is <30–40, {Medicine, Diet, Exercise}>. From database 
𝐷𝐵 the most frequent patterns are <20–30, {Diet, Exercise}> and <30–40, {Medicine, Diet, 
Exercise}>. Considering the threshold value 2 the most frequent pattern derived from these two 
databases is <30–40, {Medicine, Diet, Exercise}>. We identify the most frequent sequential 
patterns from a site using the SLPMiner algorithm. 
4.3. BACKGROUND 
4.3.1. BASIC NOTATIONS 
 
In this work we use the notations that are used in the SLPMiner algorithm. Sequential pattern 
mining was first introduced by Srikant et al. [75]. We use the basic sequence model defined in [75]. 
A sequence 𝑠 denoted by < 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , . . , 𝑡𝑛 >  is an ordered list of itemsets 𝑠𝑗 . An itemset 𝐼 =
{𝑖1, 𝑖2, … . , 𝑖𝑛}  is defined as a non-empty ordered set of items 𝑖𝑗. A sequential database 𝐷 is a set of 
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sequences. |𝐷| denotes the number of sequences in a sequential database D. The length of sequence 
𝑠 is the number of items in 𝑠 and is denoted by |𝑡|. Similarly the length of the itemset is denoted 
by |𝑖|. A sequence 𝑠 = < 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , . . , 𝑡𝑛 >  is called a sub–sequence of sequence 𝑠
′ = <
 𝑡1
′ , 𝑡2
′ , … . , 𝑡𝑚
′  > (𝑙 ≤ 𝑚) if there exist 𝑙 integers  𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑙 such that 1 ≤  𝑖1  <  𝑖2 < ⋯  <  𝑖𝑙 ≤
𝑚 and 𝑡𝑗  ⊆  𝑡𝑖𝑗
′    (𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑙). If 𝑠 is a sub – sequence of 𝑠′, then we write 𝑠 ⊆  𝑠′ and say 
sequence 𝑠′ supports 𝑠. The support of a sequence 𝛿𝐷(𝑠), is defined as |𝐷𝑠|/ |𝐷|, where 𝐷𝑠 =
{ 𝑠𝑖|𝑠 ⊆  𝑠𝑖˄ 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 }.  
4.3.2. SLPMINER ALGORITHM 
In this section we discuss the SLPMiner algorithm briefly. The SLPMiner algorithm finds all the 
frequent sequential patterns that satisfy a given length–decreasing support constraint. The length–
decreasing support constraint is defined as below: 
Given a sequential database 𝐷 and a function 𝑓(𝑙) that satisfies 1 ≥ 𝑓(𝑙) ≥ 𝑓(𝑙 + 1)  ≥ 0 for any 
positive integer 𝑙, a sequence 𝑠 is frequent if and only if 𝛿𝐷(𝑠)  ≥ 𝑓(|𝑠|). 
The SLPMiner algorithm uses an efficient database–projection–based approach for generating a 
frequent pattern. It also use three pruning methods based on the smallest valid extension (SVE) 
property to prune either entire sequences, items within certain sequences or entire projected 
databases. The SVE property helps to prune large portions of the database efficiently that are 
irrelevant for finding frequent item sets that satisfy the length–decreasing support constraint. To 
find frequent sequential patterns the SLPMiner algorithm uses the database–projection–based 
approach [77, 88, 89] which grows a Prefix tree in depth–first order. The prefix tree contains all 
the frequent sequential patterns with a given threshold support value. The root of the prefix tree is 
a null sequence and it expands to create children nodes by growing the pattern in two different 
ways, namely, item set extension and sequence extension.  At each node instead of the entire input 
database, the projected database is created which is much smaller in size compared to the input 
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database. To make the SLPMiner algorithm efficient the authors introduced three pruning methods, 
Sequence Pruning, Item Pruning, and Structure–based Pruning, which reduce the size of the 
projected database at each node of the prefix tree. 
4.3.3. SIMILARITY MEASUREMENT 
 
One of the fundamental tasks of the data mining problem involves the comparison of data and 
determining the similarity of data. A wide variety of real world applications, such as, information 
retrieval, mirror pages, document categorization, plagiarism, etc. rely on similarity computation. 
To measure the similarity between data the similarity measurement in terms of distance between 
the data is computed. Euclidean, Cosine, Jaccard, Pearson Correlation [139] are some examples of 
popular similarity measures. We use Jaccard Similarity to measure the similarity between frequent 
sequential patterns. The similarity between two finite sample sets is measured by the Jaccard 
Similarity Coefficient. The Jaccard Similarity Coefficient can be defined as below, 
                                                        𝐽(𝑆1, 𝑆2) =  
|𝑆1∩ 𝑆2|
|𝑆1∪𝑆2|
 , 0 ≤  𝐽(𝑆1, 𝑆2)  ≤ 1                                                 (7) 
According to the definition of the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient if two sets, 𝑆1, 𝑆2 are the same, 
then the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient between 𝑆1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑆2 is 1. 
4.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Privacy is a concern in data mining as the database contains sensitive private information. Therefore 
finding most frequent sequential patterns in a privacy preserving way is an important task in 
sequential pattern mining. The goal is to find the most frequent patterns held by two or more parties. 
Formally the problem can be defined as follows: – given 𝑛  parties  𝐴, 𝐵, . . , 𝐼, . . , 𝑁, where each 
party i has a database 𝐷𝐼.  For 𝑛  parties there are therefore 𝐷𝐴, 𝐷𝐵 , . . , 𝐷𝐼 , … , 𝐷𝑁 databases. The 
SLPMiner algorithm finds frequent sequential patterns at each site i, e.g. 𝑃𝑎 , 𝑃𝑏 , … , 𝑃𝑖, … , 𝑃𝑘  . The 
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similarity measurement function checks the tuple < 𝑃𝑖, 𝜎, 𝜏 >  where 𝑃𝑖,  is the frequent sequential 
pattern at different sites, e.g., 𝑃𝑖
𝐴 at site 𝐴 and  𝑃𝑖
𝐵 at site 𝐵. 𝜎 is the count of Jaccard similarity 
coefficient (=1) for a particular pattern 𝑃𝑖  (Equation 8) and 𝜏 is some threshold value. 
                                  𝜎(𝑃𝑖) =  ∑ (  𝐽(𝑃𝑖
𝐴, 𝑃𝑖
𝐵) = 1 )                                                      𝑎,𝑏 𝜖[1,𝑛]              (8) 
 𝜎 ≥  𝜏 (Equation 9) determines  𝑃𝑖 as the most frequent sequential pattern among all the 
participating sites. Privacy preserving similarity measurement reveals only the most frequent 
sequential patterns among all the participating sites. A frequent pattern 𝑃𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟 ≠ 𝑃𝑖  at site 
𝑆𝑟 whose 𝜎(𝑃𝑟)  <  𝜏 should not be disclosed to any other site since it is not a most frequent 
sequential pattern among all the sites. 
                                                                 𝜎(𝑃𝑖)  ≥  𝜏                                                                                      (9) 
4.5. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
To find the most frequent sequential patterns between at least two parties in a privacy preserving 
way we propose an algorithm (Algorithm 4.1) which uses the SLPMiner algorithm and Jaccard 
similarity measurement. The SLPMiner algorithm finds all the frequent sequential patterns at each 
site. To get the most frequent sequential patterns from all the sites we use the Jaccard Similarity 
measurement in a privacy preserving way. The proposed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4.1. 
Assuming the number of participating sites are 𝑛 and each party has a sequence database 𝐷𝑖, then 
at each site we apply the SLPMiner algorithm to find the frequent sequential patterns. In the process 
of finding frequent sequential patterns, the SLPMiner algorithm creates a prefix tree in depth first 
order. During the backtracking of the prefix tree, that is, traversing from the leaf node to the root 
node we encrypt all the nodes of a branch. Since all the nodes of the prefix tree represent the 
frequent patterns, we get all the frequent patterns in encrypted format. To encrypt the patterns any 
standard public key encryption scheme can be used where the public key – private key pair is 
54 
 
generated (line 1, Algorithm 4.1) by a Trusted Third Party (TTP), e.g., Certificate Authority (CA) 
and only the public key is distributed among all the parties.  Among all the sites the algorithm 
chooses one random site 𝑆𝑗, where 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑛] (line 5, Algorithm 4.1). All the other sites send the 
encrypted frequent patterns to site 𝑆𝑗. Site 𝑆𝑗 calculates the Jaccard Similarity coefficient between 
each and every patterns. It also checks if the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient for a particular 
encrypted pattern is equal to 1 (line 11–16, Algorithm 4.1). If the number of occurrences (i.e., 𝜎) 
of the Jaccard Similarity coefficient = 1 for a particular pattern is greater than some threshold value 
𝜏 then the pattern is a most frequent sequential pattern. Another site 𝑆𝑟, where 𝑆𝑟  ≠ 𝑆𝑗 and 𝑟 ∈
[1, 𝑛] is chosen (line 17, Algorithm 4.1) and all the most frequent sequential encrypted pattern will 
be sent to site 𝑆𝑟. The TTP sends the private key to site 𝑆𝑟 and it decrypts the patterns and publishes 
the most frequent sequential patterns. 
4.5.1. ALGORITHM 
 
INPUT: Assume there are 𝑛 sites with 𝑛 sequence databases,   𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, … , 𝐷𝑖, … , 𝐷𝑛 one 
database at each site.  A trusted third party (TTP) will generate the public key–private key 
pair (𝑥, 𝑦). A threshold value 𝜏. 
OUTPUT: The most frequent sequential patterns, 𝑃𝑎 , 𝑃𝑐 , 𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑘 , ….  , among all the sites 𝑛. 
1. Suppose there are 𝑛 number of sites. The TTP generates public key–private key 
pair (𝑥, 𝑦) and distributes the public key  𝑥 among the 𝑛 sites. 
2. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 each site 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 𝑑𝑜 
3.  Apply the SLPMiner algorithm on the available sequential database. During 
backtracking of     the  prefix tree encrypt each itemset  𝐼𝑖 of every  sequential pattern 
𝑃𝑖 =< (𝐼1), (𝐼2), . . . . , (𝐼𝑘) >. Therefore the encrypted sequential pattern becomes 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖) = < 𝐸(𝐼1), 𝐸(𝐼2), . . , 𝐸(𝐼𝑘) >  
4. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
5. Randomly choose one site 𝑆𝑗 
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6. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 each site 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 𝑑𝑜 
7.     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚 𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖 
8.        Send the encrypted sequential pattern 𝐸(𝑃𝑗) to 𝑆𝑗 
9.    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
10. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
11. At site 𝑆𝑗,  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛   𝐸(𝑃𝑘)  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚 × 𝑛 
12.    Calculate Jaccard Similarity coefficient  
13.     𝑖𝑓  Jaccard Similarity coefficient  = 1 
14.        Count number of occurrences 𝜎 of Jaccard Similarity coefficient  = 1 
15.     𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓  
16.  𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
17. Randomly choose a site 𝑆𝑟 where 𝑆𝑟  ≠ 𝑆𝑗 
18. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝐸(𝑃𝑘)   𝑘 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚 × 𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑗  
19.    𝑖𝑓 𝜎 > some threshold value 𝜏 
20.           Consider 𝐸(𝑃𝑘) as the most frequent   sequential pattern 
21.           Send 𝐸(𝑃𝑘)  to 𝑆𝑟 
22.    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓  
23.  𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
24. TTP sends the private key 𝑦 to 𝑆𝑟 
25. 𝑆𝑟 decrypts the sequential patterns and publishes the most frequent sequential patterns. 
Algorithm 4.1. 
4.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
4.6.1. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We evaluate our algorithm using different datasets generated by the IBM Quest research group 
[90].  We used two datasets with different numbers of sequences (2,000 rows of data to 10,000 
rows of data). Each sequence of data consists of eight itemsets on average.   All our experiments 
are performed on two computers with a 3.33 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 4 GB RAM and a 
64 bit operating system. We have named our datasets as DataSet1 and DataSet2. Since our 
algorithm works on encrypted frequent itemsets, we encrypt the most frequent itemsets for each 
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data set. The size of data, time to get frequent itemsets using the SLPMiner algorithm, number of 
frequent itemsets and time to encrypt the frequent itemsets for DataSet1 and DataSet2 are given 
below in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Table 2: DataSet 1 
 
Table 3: DataSet 2 
To get the common, most frequent itemsets between DataSet1 and DataSet2 we use Algorithm 2. 
Although we have considered two sites only, we can use our algorithm for multiple number of sites. 
The experimental results, namely, size of data, number frequent datasets in two sites, common 
frequent itemsets between two sites, time to get common frequent itemsets and decryption time to 
get actual data from encrypted datasets are shown in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Experimental results 
 
4.7. ANALYSIS 
 
We analyze our algorithm in terms of correctness analysis, privacy analysis, and performance 
analysis. 
4.7.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS 
In Algorithm 4.1 we calculate the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient between the encrypted frequent 
sequential patterns. From the definition of Jaccard Similarity Coefficient (Equation 7) we know if 
the two sets are same then the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient between two sets are 1. Assume two 
parties 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘  are participating. Any sequential pattern 𝑃𝑖 (at site 𝑖) consists of itemsets, 𝑃𝑖 =<
(𝐼1), (𝐼2), . . , (𝐼𝑚) >. Instead of encrypting the entire pattern we encrypt each itemset of a sequential 
pattern, 𝐸(𝑃𝑖) = < 𝐸(𝐼1), 𝐸(𝐼2), … … , 𝐸(𝐼𝑚) > where 𝐸(𝑃𝑖) acts as the set and  𝐸(𝐼1),
𝐸(𝐼2), … … , 𝐸(𝐼𝑚) are the elements of the set. The algorithm calculates the Jaccard Similarity 
Coefficient between two encrypted patterns 𝐸(𝑃𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸(𝑃𝑘) at some other site 𝑟, where 𝐸(𝑃𝑘) =
 < 𝐸(𝐼1), 𝐸(𝐼2), … … , 𝐸(𝐼𝑚) >. Since 𝑃𝑖 =  𝑃𝑘 therefore, 
                                                𝐽(𝐸(𝑃𝑖), 𝐸(𝑃𝑘)) =  
|𝐸(𝑃𝑖)∩ 𝐸(𝑃𝑘)|
|𝐸(𝑃𝑖)∪𝐸(𝑃𝑘)|
= 1                                                   (10) 
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Equation (10) proves if the patterns are same the Jaccard similarity coefficient between two 
encrypted patterns are 1. 
4.7.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
In our proposed algorithm each site 𝑖 encrypts their patterns and sends them to other randomly 
selected site 𝑘. Since only the encrypted frequent patterns are shared with the other site 𝑘 and 
private key 𝑥 is not available, knowing the real frequent patterns is not possible. The TTP sends 
the private key to some other randomly selected site 𝑆𝑟 which has only the most frequent sequential 
patterns in encrypted format. This selected site 𝑆𝑟 publish the common, most frequent sequential 
patterns. Since all the shared patterns are in encrypted format and sites are chosen randomly, any 
private or sensitive data is not compromised.  
4.7.3. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
 
From the experimental results we see that the time to get the frequent sequential patterns from each 
of the data sets using the SLPMiner algorithm is at most 50 seconds. The time to encrypt the 
frequent itemsets is less than 0.3 seconds for 10,000 rows of data and the decryption time is less 
than 0.15 seconds for 10,000 rows of data. The total time to get the most frequent sequential patterns 
between the two participating sites using the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient is at most 2.5 seconds. 
The time measurements of our experiments reflect the fact that our algorithm performs well and is 
efficient.  
4.8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Privacy preserving data mining ensures analysis of large volumes of data among different 
participating sites without revealing details of private, sensitive data. We propose a privacy 
preserving sequential pattern mining algorithm which publishes only common, most frequent 
sequential patterns among participating sites in a privacy preserving manner. The analysis of our 
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algorithm in terms of privacy and correctness imply that our algorithm is correct and it protects 
sensitive information from unwanted or unsolicited disclosure. The performance analysis proves 
the efficiency of our algorithm. 
 
60 
 
CHAPTER V 
MULTILEVEL THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING IN DISTRIBUTED CLOUD 
 
5.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Distributed cloud [95] makes use of resources provided by users in a P2P manner. In the 
distributed cloud resources are virtualized. The existing cloud uses huge data centers where 
resources are provided using virtualization techniques. Some of the voluntary computing systems 
such as BOINC [96], SETI [97] and Planetlab [98] uses resources provided by users, but these are 
managed by a central entity and are completely different from either a centralized cloud or the 
distributed cloud. Unlike users of the existing cloud, who don’t have control over the resources, in 
the distributed cloud users can choose resources of their choice. Moreover, in the distributed cloud, 
resources are provided by users. Since users of the distributed cloud have more control over 
resource selection, they can perform strong encryption to secure their data. The only issue will be 
managing these keys. We use a secret sharing mechanism to protect secret keys in the distributed 
cloud. Secret sharing schemes can mitigate the risks of managing these keys. Secret sharing 
schemes are used in many cryptographic protocols. Threshold secret threshold secret sharing 
schemes was introduced by Shamir [99] and Blakley [100]. In the threshold secret sharing 
mechanism, information is split into multiple shares and these shares are distributed among 
multiple users. The only way to retrieve the information is to have all the shares or a qualified 
number of shares available. This qualified number is the threshold. This means that any number of 
shares less than the threshold cannot retrieve the information. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is 
based on polynomial interpolation whereas Blakley’s secret sharing scheme is based on  
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 geometry. Several secret sharing schemes has been introduced, e.g., threshold secret sharing 
scheme, ideal secret sharing, linear secret sharing, multi linear secret sharing, [99, 100, 101, 102] 
etc. The Asmuth and Bloom secret sharing scheme [103] uses the Chinese reminder theorem to 
reconstruct shares. Multi linear secret sharing schemes [104] uses monotone span programs. In 
these schemes, secret is a sequence of elements from a finite field and the share is derived using 
the secret and some random elements from the field. If the secret is of size one i.e. has only one 
element it is called linear. We propose a multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme to provide 
security of secret key in the distributed cloud. In the first level of the proposed secret sharing 
scheme we split the secret key into multiple shares and distribute them among multiple resource 
providers. The second level consists of splitting each share into multiple numbers of sub-secrets at 
each resource provider. To make our scheme secure we make the determination of threshold value 
at the second level dynamic. We generate a share pool which is used to determine the number of 
shares at each resource provider using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [105]. The 
advantage of our proposed scheme is that in the distributed cloud, users provide resources and 
therefore do not need to invest in the commercial cloud such as Amazon AWS [106], EC2 [107], 
Windows Azure [108] etc. Security in the distributed cloud has not been studied much and our 
scheme provides a secure way to protect the secret key. We perform the multilevel threshold secret 
sharing mechanism on the secret key itself as the key plays an important role in encrypting or 
decrypting the file content. In our proposed scheme the secret is distributed over multiple resource 
providers therefore an attacker cannot have the original secret until and unless all the participating 
resource providers are compromised. We generate the replica of each secret share to ensure the fact 
that if a provider is compromised then that particular share is available from other providers. 
Moreover the user can revoke the access of any resource provider if the provider is compromised. 
We increase the chances of detecting a compromised provider by introducing dummy key shares 
at each resource provider. We use Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme [99]. This is an ideal 
secret sharing scheme as the size of the secret is identical with the size of shares. A lot of work 
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[102, 109, 110] has been developed based on [99]. A threshold ideal secret sharing has been 
proposed in [109] which uses only XOR operations to make shares and to recover the secret. The 
authors also show that this scheme is secure and faster with reduced storage usage and 
computational cost compared to [99]. In [110] a multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme has 
been proposed with two modifications of [99]. The first modification allows the shareholders to 
keep both the x coordinate and y- coordinate of a polynomial as a private share and in the second 
modification a polynomial degree larger than the threshold value is used by the dealers to generate 
the share. In our scheme we perform splitting the secret twice, once by the user and the other by 
the resource provider. At resource provider along with the shares we also store dummy shares which 
improves security. Another type of secret sharing scheme, Linear secret sharing scheme [99, 100, 
102] is based on linear algebra and it contains super polynomial lower bounds on the share size. 
Though [99] can only realize the access structure of the secret sharing scheme, [102] can design a 
secret sharing scheme from any given access structure. A multi linear secret sharing scheme which 
uses super polynomial bounds on the share size has been proposed in [101]. In [111] the authors 
introduce a hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme. In this scheme the secret is shared in a 
hierarchical structure among groups of participants which is further partitioned into levels. In our 
multi-level threshold secret sharing scheme we provide security to protect secret key in the 
distributed cloud and we generate dummy keys and replica of each secret share to detect existence 
of a compromised provider. 
5.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
In the distributed cloud model [95, 112], computation and data is stored in resources provided by 
other users as shown in Fig. 3. Since users use resources provided by other users, there are obvious 
security concerns. Dependable Storage in the Intercloud [71], provides reasons why the single cloud 
is not secure, namely, we need to have more than one cloud to make the system more secure. The 
Distributed cloud model by itself solves the problem of single domain cloud as it has more than 
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one user who will be acting as a cloud provider. In the distributed cloud, protecting data stored on 
other users’ resources poses security issues, which is handled using standard encryption techniques, 
which in turn leads to key management issues and insider attacks. A resource provider can get 
access to the data stored on his resources with ease and can use brute force attacks on it. Security 
of data storage currently depends on the strength of the encryption keys and the effectiveness of 
the key management schemes use. So instead of having a single key that gives access to the 
encrypted files, we propose using multiple shares. In our proposed secret sharing mechanism in the 
distributed cloud we use secure mechanisms to enhance the security of secret key shares. We have 
a share pool that determines the number of shares for a particular key share. In the distributed cloud, 
since users can join and leave the cloud, we need to make sure this resource pool is always available. 
So we make duplicates of this pool and store them for multiple resource providers in the distributed 
cloud. 
5.3. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
5.3.1. PRELIMINARIES 
 
In this section we discuss the basic preliminaries we use in this work, namely, Shamir’s threshold 
secret sharing scheme and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.  
5.3.1.1. SHAMIR’S THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING 
We use Shamir’s (𝑘, 𝑛) threshold secret sharing scheme [99]. Shamir’s (𝑘, 𝑛) threshold secret 
sharing scheme is based on polynomial interpolation. A secret 𝑆 can be shared by 𝑛 number of 
users and can be reconstructed as well, if the number of shares to reconstruct exceeds some 
threshold value 𝑘. This scheme uses a polynomial function of order (𝑘 − 1) which can be 
constructed as, 
                                            𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑑0 +  𝑑1𝑥 + 𝑑2𝑥
2+. . . + 𝑑𝑘−1𝑥
𝑘−1                                           (11) 
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Here 𝑑0 is the secret 𝑆. 
Given any 𝑘 shares < 𝑥0, 𝑓(𝑥0) >, … , < 𝑥𝑘−1, 𝑓(𝑥𝑘−1) > the secret 𝑆 can be reconstructed using 
the Lagrange Interpolation formula as follows: 
                                                                    𝑆 =  ∑ (∏
𝑥𝑗
𝑥𝑗−𝑥𝑖
) 𝑖≠𝑗
𝑘−1
𝑖=0 𝑓(𝑥𝑖)                                           (12) 
5.3.1.2. CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM 
We use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [105] to generate the threshold value at each 
resource provider at the second level of the threshold secret sharing scheme. Given the following 
system of equations, 
𝑥 = 𝑎1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝1 
𝑥 = 𝑎2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝2 
… … … … .. 
𝑥 = 𝑎𝑘  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑘  
There is one unique solution as  
                                                                 𝑥 =  ∑
𝑃
𝑝𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃                                                            (13) 
Where 𝑃 =  𝑝1𝑝2 … 𝑝𝑘 and 
𝑃
𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑝𝑖 = 1,  if all moduli are pairwise coprime, i.e., 
gcd(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) = 1 for every 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
 
5.3.2. PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
The Distributed cloud is formed using the resource provided by users and can provide resources 
for free to everyone who is part of the system. The Distributed cloud makes use of virtualization to 
allocate resources to multiple users and shares available resources efficiently and it also avoids 
single point of failure. In this work we propose a scheme to protect the secret key using a multilevel 
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threshold secret sharing mechanism as shown in Fig. 20 in the distributed cloud environment. Our 
proposed scheme encrypts the file using the secret key before distributing the key shares among 
participant resource providers whom we assume to be honest. At the first level the user splits the 
key and distributes the shares among resource providers. Instead of attaching key shares as 
metadata to the pieces of data [71] we split the key shares at each resource provider again into 
multiple shares in the second level. The second level of our mechanism improves the security since 
to get the original secret the attacker has to have all the shares from the two levels. We generate the 
threshold value in the second level dynamically which enhances the security as the attacker cannot 
know about the threshold value beforehand. In addition to that at each resource provider we create 
dummy keys which increases the probability of knowing if a resource provider is compromised by 
any attacker. In Algorithm 5.1 we ensure the security of the secret key in a distributed cloud 
environment. To do that we use the multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme (t, n) in which the 
first level uses the threshold t < n and the second level uses the threshold t = m. 
First the user splits the secret key into n number of shares 𝑆𝑖,where i ∈ (1, n) and distribute them 
among all resource providers (Algorithm 5.2. line 1-7). At this level the threshold value t < n is set 
which indicates that to reconstruct the secret key at least t number of shares would be required. 
Each share of secret 𝑆𝑖 is replicated into k numbers so that if one resource provider goes offline or 
is compromised then that share can be accessed from other resource provider. At each resource 
provider we further split the share 𝑆𝑖 into m number of shares 𝑆𝑖𝑗 (Algorithm 5.2. line 12). At this 
level, i.e., second level the threshold value m is generated dynamically. To determine the number 
of shares m each resource provider 𝑅𝑖, i ∈ (1, n) selects a (𝑃𝑖, 𝑁𝑖) pair from the share pool SP 
(Algorithm 5.2 line 9-12). The share pool is created beforehand (Algorithm 5.1. Generate share 
pool SP) .The user saves the pair (i, 𝑃𝑖) for each provider 𝑅𝑖 and the provider saves 𝑁𝑖. We intend 
to have multiple share pools and place one or two of them in each cluster of the distributed cloud. 
The CRT solution generates a number m which decides the number of shares to split and reconstruct 
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in the second level. At each resource provider at least j number of dummy shares  𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝐷 , where i ∈
{1, n} and 𝑗 ≥ 𝑚, are generated (Algorithm 5.2 line 13). Whenever a resource provider is 
compromised, the user revokes the access of that particular resource provider. We intend to have a 
greater number of dummy shares than secret shares,i.e.,j ≥ m, so that if any outside attacker tries to 
get the share, the probability that he ends up with the dummy share instead of a real share is greater 
than or equal to 0.5. This helps the user to take action (e.g., revoke the access of that resource 
provider) accordingly when some attacker selects a dummy key. To reconstruct the key sub shares, 
each resource provider need to have 𝑃𝑖 from the user to generate the threshold value m (Algorithm 
5.3. line 2). The user reconstructs the secret S from t numbers of 𝑆𝑖 shares.  
 
Figure 20: Proposed multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme 
 
5.3.2.1. ALGORITHM  
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INPUT:  Secret key 𝑆, 𝑛 number of resource providers in the distributed cloud, threshold value 
𝑡 ≤ 𝑛. 
ALGORITHM 5.1.GENERATE SHARE POOL 𝑺𝑷 
From this share pool each resource provider generates a number out of a selected pair.  
1. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛 
2.    Generate a random series of pairwise relatively prime positive integers, 𝑃𝑖 =
{𝑝𝑖1, 𝑝𝑖2, … . , 𝑝𝑖𝑚}. 
3.    Generate a random series of 𝑚 arbitrary integers 𝑁𝑖 = {𝑛𝑖1, 𝑛𝑖2, … . , 𝑛𝑖𝑚}. 
4.    Place these two series 𝑃𝑖 along with 𝑁𝑖 , represented as (𝑃𝑖, 𝑁𝑖) in 𝑆𝑃. 
5. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
 
ALGORITHM5. 2. SPLIT ALGORITHM 
 
1. User 𝑈  encrypts the file 𝑓 with secret key 𝑆. 
2. Split the secret key 𝑆 into 𝑛 number of shares, 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝑆4, … . . , 𝑆𝑛 .  
3. To reconstruct 𝑆 at least 𝑡 number of shares are required. 
4. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑜𝑓 𝑆 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝑛}  
5.      Replicate the share 𝑆𝑖 into 𝑘 (≥ 1) number of replicas. 
6.      Distribute the replicas among 𝑛 number of resource providers. 
7. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
8. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝑛} 
9.      Select a pair (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖) from 𝑆𝑃. 
10.      User 𝑈 saves (𝑖, 𝑃𝑖) and 𝑅𝑖 saves 𝑁𝑖. 
11.      Get a unique solution 𝑚 = 𝑥𝑖 from (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑁𝑖) using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). 
12.      Split the share of secret 𝑆𝑖 into 𝑚 number of shares, 𝑆𝑖1, 𝑆𝑖2, 𝑆𝑖3, 𝑆𝑖4, … . . , 𝑆𝑖𝑚 . 
13.      Generate 𝑗 number of dummy shares  𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝐷, where 𝑗 ≥ 𝑚. 
14. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
 
ALGORITHM 5.3.RECONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM 
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1. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝑛} 
2.     𝑅𝑖 asks for (𝑖, 𝑃𝑖) pair from user 𝑈 and 𝑅𝑖 has 𝑁𝑖. 
3.    Get the unique solution 𝑚 = 𝑥𝑖 from (𝑃𝑖, 𝑁𝑖) using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). 
4.    Reconstruct the share of secret 𝑆𝑖 from 𝑚 number of shares, 𝑆𝑖 =   𝑆𝑖1, 𝑆𝑖2, 𝑆𝑖3, 𝑆𝑖4, … . . , 𝑆𝑖𝑚. 
5.  𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
6. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝑡} 
7.       Collect the share 𝑆𝑖 from each resource provider. 
8. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
9. Reconstruct the secret 𝑆 from  𝑆𝑖 where 𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑡}. 
 
5.4. RESULTS 
5.4.1. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
We performed simulations using a distributed cloud model that is based on the P2P overlay 
Kademlia [114]. We implemented our algorithm for secret sharing on the distributed cloud. We 
assumed that resource providers have a minimum of 2 GB RAM up to 16 GB, 2 to 8 cores. First a 
node identifies available resource providers near it and then divides the key into multiple shares 
and distributes each share to an available resource provider. The resource provider again creates 
more shares by using its share as the secret and stores it. The user will maintain the list of providers 
who store the secret shares. When a user requires the key, she contacts other resource providers 
who have the shares. After resource providers receive the request, they combine the shares they 
have and send the actual share to the user. Once the threshold numbers of shares are received by 
the user, she will reproduce the original key and use it. 
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Fig. 21 shows the average total time to split the secret into shares at the first level, find resources, 
distribute the shares to resource providers and split the shares at the second level. We can see that 
as the number of nodes increases, the time to find nodes and distribute shares to nearby nodes 
decreases. Since the distributed cloud is formed by many users we can see our mechanism for secret 
sharing is feasible and efficient. 
Fig. 22 shows the time to retrieve the shares from resource providers and combine them to 
reproduce the secret. We see that the average time to retrieve shares from resource providers and 
to combine them takes significantly less time when compared to distributing the shares. In order to 
make sure that there are shares available to the user at any time replicas of shares are made and 
stored on multiple resource providers in the distributed cloud. This increases the chances of 
retrieving the share efficiently even when some of the nodes leave the network. 
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Figure 21: Time to split shares and distribute them to other nodes 
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Figure 22: Time to retrieve shares and combine them 
 
5.4.2. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this work since we are using a threshold secret sharing scheme and we are storing the shares and 
their replicas on multiple resource providers, compromising one or more resource providers will 
not disclose the secret. At the second level at each resource provider we generate equal or more 
dummy shares which an attacker may access as actual shares. If the resource provider is 
compromised by an outside attacker then the probability of using the dummy shares is greater than 
or equal to 0.5. This increases the chances for a resource provider to react to any security breach 
immediately. We create a share pool to reduce the user overhead in deciding the number of shares 
to be split. Since the resource provider selects (𝑃𝑖, 𝑁𝑖) pairs randomly no eavesdropper can make a 
guess about the number of shares beforehand.  
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5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We propose a multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme to ensure the security of secret key in the 
distributed cloud environment. Our scheme can also be used for other distributed and P2P systems. 
Our findings show that a secret key, which plays a significant role to encrypt and decrypt the file 
content stored in cloud storage, can be stored securely in a distributed cloud environment. The 
increasing number of providers in the distributed cloud decreases the time to split and distribute 
the shares. Experimental and security analysis shows that our scheme is feasible and secure. Data 
replication is another issue in distributed systems and we will look into new strategies to perform 
data replication to increase response time for retrieving data and making the distributed cloud more 
robust. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PRIVACY PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED CLOUD STORAGE 
 
6.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Cloud computing [8, 9, 115] is an innovative model which has attracted plenty of attention from 
both industry as well as academia. Cloud computing allows users to manage resources in a flexible 
and scalable manner. There is a substantial increase in number of IT firms, schools and regular 
users using the cloud resources. Cloud resources have been replacing desktops, laptops, large 
storage devices, servers, etc. In order to effectively use these available resources, the distributed 
cloud computing model [112, 116, 95] has been introduced. Virtualization [117] is key concept for 
making cloud computing possible. Xen is one of the open source standard for hardware 
virtualization used by many cloud providers. Hyper-V, KVM, and Sun xVM are some of the other 
key virtualization management tools used. Cloud providers provide resources in form of various 
instances based on user needs. For example Amazon provides for different sizes of virtual machine 
instances – Small, Medium, Large and Extra Large. Moreover these resources are scalable and can 
be increased or decreased according to needs. These virtualization tools can be run on small 
machines like simple desktops and laptops. 
The distributed cloud uses virtualization techniques to effectively use resources which are lying 
idle. Cloud computing uses a centralized architecture. With the increase in the number of users 
network traffic has increased tremendously at data center locations. Moreover it requires huge 
amounts of energy to maintain these data centers. Distributed cloud can be used to mitigate these 
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problems of a centralized cloud and use unused resources effectively thereby providing a green 
computing model. The distributed cloud provides all the services that a cloud can provide. Since 
these resources are provided by individual users located in a wide geographical area, the network 
traffic is also widely distributed. In addition there isn’t a single point of failure as it uses a 
completely decentralized architecture. Security and privacy is a concern in both the distributed 
cloud as well as the existing cloud models. Since users store and do computation on resources 
provided by other users we need a secure and privacy preserving mechanism to store and retrieve 
data. Confidentiality, integrity and availability are three major security concerns along with privacy 
when resources are provided by others. Data confidentiality and integrity can be ensured using 
encryption mechanisms. Availability depends on the resource management model. A novel 
resource management mechanism for distributed cloud using Multi-valued hash table mechanism 
and game theoretic model [116, 62] has been proposed. However there has not been any research 
on preserving privacy of data in the distributed cloud. In this work we propose a secure and privacy 
preserving mechanism to share, store and retrieve data in a distributed cloud model. 
6.2.  DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
The resource provider is a user who provides the services in a distributed cloud. Resources can be 
any kind of service offered by a resource provider. Software as a Service, Platform as a Service, 
Infrastructure as a Service and Storage as a Service can be provided by the resource provider. The 
distributed cloud provides storage and computation resources in a peer-to-peer fashion over an open 
network. This leads to security and privacy issues that need to be resolved. Transferring data and 
processing information to another user providing the service requires security and privacy. If we 
send data and information in an encrypted format, the resource needs to have the key in order to 
update it. Providing the security key to the resource provider leads to security and privacy issues. 
Moreover when we need to search the data using keywords, all the information regarding the data 
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provider, data content, and the details of queried data can be monitored by an outsider or malicious 
party.  
The security model we propose encrypts the data and its names using a homomorphic encryption 
scheme. To retrieve the data the file name is encrypted to avoid advertising the real keywords we 
are searching for over the network. In order to preserve privacy of the contents of the file, i.e., the 
actual data, we split them and perform a homomorphic encryption on the data and store it on the 
resource providers. We use homomorphic properties to query and validate the resultant data. In this 
work we use homomorphic encryption to store or share the files in a privacy preserving manner 
among different resource providers. We use the multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme. 
RSA, ElGamal [118, 119] encryption schemes support multiplicative homomorphic property. 
According to the multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme if 𝐸(𝑥)denotes the cipher text of 
plain text 𝑥 then it satisfies 𝐸(𝑥1)  ∙ 𝐸(𝑥2) = 𝐸(𝑥1  ∙ 𝑥2). 
Privacy preserving is one of the main issues in both distributed and centralized cloud computing 
systems. In [120], authors used public key homomorphic authenticator mechanism to achieve 
privacy preserving public cloud data auditing systems. In the cloud since all the resources are in 
one location, auditing information should be preserved. In [15], the author uses public key 
encryption based keyword search in cloud so that we need not decrypt the entire message. But in 
distributed cloud we only search for exact keywords to find the file name and we don’t want to 
decrypt the data to find out the value of the keyword. This method of searching encrypted data over 
an encrypted pool of messages is computationally more expensive. In [17, 121], authors proposed 
homomorphic encryption to protect sensitive data stored in a cloud data center and shared by 
multiple clients.  Homomorphic encryption mechanism is used to preserve security and privacy of 
data by using additive or multiplicative properties. In order to check the similarity between two 
encrypted files, Euclidean distance can be used to measure the distance between them [122].   
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6.3. SECURITY AND PRIVACY PRESERVING MECHANISM 
 
In our proposed solution we consider security and preserving privacy of data to be stored on 
resource providers. Since we are using a distributed cloud, the computation and storage are on 
resource providers. In order to retrieve the data we use file names or key words to search in the 
distributed cloud. The key idea is to split data/file into multiple partitions and encrypt those 
partitions using a multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme as shown in Fig. 23. For the file 
name of a data or keywords we do not use the split mechanism.  
 
Figure 23: Overall view of proposed scheme 
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Preserving security and privacy of data is a twofold process. The first step is to encrypt the name 
of the data and in the second step encrypt the actual data. To store and retrieve data in a distributed 
cloud we propose two algorithms. Algorithm 6.1 and Algorithm 6.2 describe the procedure to store 
data on resource providers and retrieve data from resource providers respectively. To store data on 
resource providers we encrypt the data name/file name (Algorithm 6.1 Step 1) and distribute the 
data content among different resource providers (Algorithm 6.1 Step 2). Encrypting the data 
name/file name is a simple one step process. We split the original data content into multiple random 
partitions and encrypt each partition using a multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme. We 
then calculate the Euclidean distance between different random encrypted data partitions before 
distributing them among different resource providers. Retrieving the data from different resource 
providers includes validating the data name/file name (Algorithm 6.2 Step 1) and retrieving the 
data partitions (Algorithm 6.2 Step 2) from different resource providers. To validate the data 
name/file name we calculate the distance between encrypted data/ file name. If the distance is zero 
then we proceed to retrieve the data partitions of that particular data/ file. After all the partitions 
have been retrieved the user measures the distances between the encrypted random partitions and 
compare them with distances stored. If the same distance values are the same, this indicates that 
the file has not been tampered with. 
6.3.1. ALGORITHM 
 
ALGORITHM 6.1. STORING DATA ON RESOURCE PROVIDERS   
INPUT: File name 𝑓, Data 𝑚 , Public key–private key pair (𝑥, 𝑦).  
Step 1: Encrypt the data name/file name 
1. Encrypt the file name 𝑓 using a multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme. 
 
Step 2: Distribute the data among different Resource Providers 
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1. Split the data 𝑚 into 𝑛 number of partitions, 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … . , 𝑚𝑛. 
2. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ data partitions 𝑚𝑖 ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, 𝑛} 
3. Encrypt the data partitions using a multiplicative homomorphic encryption     
scheme,  𝐸(𝑚1), 𝐸(𝑚2), … . , 𝐸(𝑚𝑛). 
4. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
5. Choose a random number   𝑟 | 1 < 𝑟 < 𝑛. 
6. Calculate the Euclidean distance 𝑑 between 𝑟  random pair of encrypted data partitions. 
7. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑟 random pair  of encrypted data 
8.  Store the calculated Euclidean distances 𝑑1, 𝑑2,... . . ,  𝑑𝑟  in< 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑑𝑖), 𝐸(𝑚𝑗),
𝐸(𝑚𝑘) >     format. Here 𝑑𝑖 is the distance between  𝐸(𝑚𝑗) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸(𝑚𝑘). 
9. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
10. Distribute the encrypted data partitions among resource providers. 
 
ALGORITHM 6.2: RETRIEVE THE DATA FROM RESOURCE PROVIDERS 
Step 1: Validate the name 
1. Search using the encrypted file name 𝐸(𝑓) . 
2. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 possible resource providers 𝑅𝑖 
3.      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 available encrypted file names 𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖) in the resource provider 𝑅𝑖 
4.           Calculate the Euclidean distance 𝐷(𝐶) between  𝐸(𝑓) and 𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖) 
5.           𝑖𝑓 𝐷(𝐶) = 0 
6.               Retrieve the data partitions using Step 2. 
7.           𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
8.       𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
9. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
 
Step 2: Retrieving the data 
1. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑟 random pair of encrypted data partitions 𝐸(𝑚𝑖
′) retrieved 
2.     Calculate the distances, 𝑑1
′ , 𝑑2
′ , … . , 𝑑𝑟
′  , between encrypted pair of random data 
partitions.   
3.     Compare 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 =  𝑑𝑖
′ is true 
4.           Data partition is not tampered. 
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5.           Decrypt the Data partition with private key 𝑦. 
6.      𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
7. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
 
6.4. ANALYSIS 
 
In this work we analyze our proposed solution in terms of correctness analysis, privacy analysis 
and performance analysis. 
6.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In our solution we calculate the Euclidean distance between two encrypted file names 𝐸(𝑓) and 
𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖)  (Algorithm 6.2 Step 1 line 4). Since we encrypt the data using a multiplicative 
homomorphic encryption scheme we can perform arithmetic operations on those encrypted data. 
To prove correctness, the decrypted result of the Euclidean distance 𝐷(𝐶) (Algorithm 6.2 Step 1 
line 5) between two encrypted data yields the Euclidean distance between the two original data. 
𝐷(𝐶) 
= 𝐷(𝐸(𝑓) ∗ 𝐸(𝑓) + 𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖) ∗ 𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖) − 2 ∗ 𝐸(𝑓) ∗ 𝐸(𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖)) 
= 𝐷(𝐸(𝑓 − 𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖)
2
) 
=  (𝑓 − 𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖)
2 
 
A zero Euclidean distance between 𝑓  and 𝑓𝑟𝑝𝑖 data denotes that they are same. Similarly to 
retrieve the data partitions we calculate the Euclidean distances between them. 
6.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
 
In this subsection we explain how we preserve the privacy of data. We distribute the data partitions 
in encrypted format among different resource providers (Algorithm 6.1 Step 2 line 3) and the key 
pair (𝑥, 𝑦) is only known to the user. Therefore no other party can learn anything 
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but 𝐸(𝑚1), 𝐸(𝑚2), … . , 𝐸(𝑚𝑛). We calculate the distance between encrypted file names and 
retrieve the data partitions only when the distance between the encrypted file names is zero. We 
also calculate the distance between the random pairs of encrypted data partitions to verify the 
integrity of data. Our proposed scheme preserves privacy and is secure since no third party or 
adversary can know about the original data as we have distributed the data partitions in encrypted 
format and compute operations on encrypted data where the key pair is only known to the user. 
6.4.3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
We implement our algorithm for different sizes of file storage in a simulated distributed cloud 
environment. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm we vary the sizes of files and perform 
a privacy preserving homomorphic encryption scheme on the data partitions and file names. To 
query encrypted file names our algorithm takes 0.2 milliseconds. To store different sizes of files in 
the distributed cloud environment and to retrieve them back using our proposed solution takes 0.2 
second for 10KB of data. Fig. 24 depicts the evaluation times of our algorithm for varying file sizes. 
From the performance evaluation we can see that the elapsed time increases linearly with increasing 
file sizes. In order to meet time constraints the partition size can be varied accordingly. 
 
Figure 24: File Size - Elapsed Time 
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6.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We use homomorphic encryption mechanism and its multiplicative property to preserve security 
and privacy of data in a distributed cloud. Our method works on encrypted data without revealing 
the actual data. We also show that our algorithm is correct and preserves the privacy of data. The 
performance analysis of our algorithm shows its efficiency and feasibility. This work shows that 
we can preserve privacy and security of data in the distributed cloud. In future we intend to work 
on preserving privacy of database records in the distributed cloud.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SECURE AND PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION USING 
WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
 
 
7.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To authenticate the identity of any user, biometric authentication is one of the most trustworthy 
techniques as it involves verification of users biometric traits. Biometric authentication systems 
authenticate users based on their physical traits, such as, fingerprint, face image, iris, signature etc. 
which are unique. Different biometric authentication mechanism has been used extensively in 
various domains. In [123] the authors proposed a framework for three–factor authentication scheme 
in a distributed system. A template protecting biometric authentication scheme to fingerprint data 
has been implemented in [124]. In this finger print based authentication mechanism the authors 
have presented an algorithm which identifies the reliable components of Gabor filtered fingerprint 
and applies quantization to make a binary representation of the fingerprint. Noise correction is 
applied on the quantized binary representation. A multimodal biometric authentication scheme for 
adapting score–level fusion functions based on quality measures has been proposed in [125]. In 
[126] a novel and efficient facial image representation based on local binary pattern (LBP) has been 
proposed which extracts the LBP feature distributions by dividing the face image into several 
regions and concatenating them into an enhanced feature vector to be used as a face descriptor. 
Instead of using two different biometric traits a personal identification scheme using palm print and 
hand geometry which can be acquired from the same image has been proposed in [127]. The authors 
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have integrated the hand geometry on the palm print to improve the performance of the verification 
system. 
Watermarking is a technique to embed specific data in a digital content. The watermarking scheme 
has enormous diversity. It can be categorized [128, 129, 130] based on the embedding domain 
(Spatial domain, Transform domain, Feature domain), watermarking host signal (video signal, 
audio signal, IC design, etc.), availability of original signal during extraction (blind, semi–blind, 
non–blind) etc. The watermarking technique is advantageous because, to embed the watermark into 
the original data this technique does not create any separate file to store authentication information. 
Besides all the advantages of the watermarking technique, any modification on the embedded data 
can be manipulated easily. Therefore one important requirement of the watermark technique is to 
make it almost unrecognizable and robust so that watermark cannot be removed or modified by any 
attack. To make the biometric watermarking technique more secure, encryption based privacy 
preserving techniques can be applied. Some watermarking techniques (e.g., fragile, robust) 
becomes invalid or detectable if a slight modification or some image processing operations such as 
image scaling, cropping, bending is done on the watermarked image. As any individual’s biometric 
features are unique therefore these biometric features should not be disclosed under any 
circumstances to any adversary. In our work, we focus on the privacy preserving secure biometric 
watermarking scheme for authentication purposes. We preserve the privacy of users’ watermarked 
biometrics using cryptography. To overcome the vulnerability of biometric authentications and to 
protect the privacy of a user’s watermarked biometrics, we use biometric authentication in 
conjunction with digital watermarking and cryptography. We embed the fingerprint on the facial 
image as a watermark to improve the security of user authentication. To achieve the privacy of a 
user’s biometric traits we encrypt the watermarked biometric before user verification.  
A number of biometric watermarking techniques has been proposed. In [128] the authors proposed 
a semi–blind biometric watermarking scheme using both a watermarking technique and face image 
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recognition. The face features are embedded in the non-overlapping blocks of the host image using 
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) .A robust hybrid biometric watermarking approach for 
offline handwritten signature has been proposed in [129]. The authors amalgamate the lifting 
wavelet transform (LWT) and SVD to make the biometric watermarking technique robust. In [130] 
a watermarking scheme in spatial domain for color image using the SVD technique has been 
introduced. Three dimensions of color iris images are used to embed into color face image to make 
the technique robust and reliable. An image ownership and tampering authentication scheme based 
on watermarking techniques has been proposed in [131]. The watermarking technique is used here 
to detect malicious manipulation over embedded images and to protect the rightful ownership. In 
[132] the authors proposed an efficient and secure encryption scheme to transmit the biometric data 
over unsecured data channel. An asymmetric watermarking technique has been proposed in [133]. 
In [134] a layered architecture for watermarking technique has been proposed which provides 
security by using cryptography primitives on top of the watermarking algorithm. Many biometric 
watermarking techniques have been proposed but watermarked biometric can be a threat to security 
if it is attacked by a determined attacker. In this work we propose a biometric authentication scheme 
while ensuring privacy of the users’ watermarked biometrics. 
7.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
We verify the authentication of a user in a privacy preserving secure manner using the user’s 
biometrics, watermarking scheme and cryptography. The problem can be framed formally as 
follows. There are 𝑛 number of users 𝑈1, 𝑈2, … . , 𝑈𝑖 , … , 𝑈𝑛 and a server 𝑆 which holds a database 
𝐷𝑓𝑣 with all users’ encrypted watermarked feature vector 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣. Given a user 𝑈𝑖′𝑠 biometrics, 
i.e., face image ( 𝐼 ) and fingerprint( 𝐹), the user’s face image ‘𝐼’ will be watermarked with 
fingerprint ′𝐹′ and will be denoted as 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣 . The Euclidean distance 𝜕 between the user’s encrypted 
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watermarked feature vector 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣  and the encrypted watermarked feature vectors 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣, in 𝐷𝑓𝑣 
decides the user’s authentication (Eqn. 14).   
                                              𝜕 (𝐸(𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣), 𝐸(𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣)) ≤  𝜏                                                              (14)  
𝜏 denotes the threshold value and if 𝜕 ≤  𝜏, the algorithm determines that the user is authentic. 
 
7.3. PRELIMINARIES 
7.3.1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
 
We calculate the Euclidean distance between two cipher texts and to do that we use a homomorphic 
property based encryption scheme. In this work we use multiplicative homomorphic property. For 
example, RSA and ElGamal [15, 17] supports the multiplicative homomorphic property, i.e., if 
𝐸(𝑥)denotes the ciphertext of plain text 𝑥 then according to multiplicative homomorphism, 𝐸(𝑥1)  ∙
𝐸(𝑥2) = 𝐸(𝑥1  ∙ 𝑥2). 
7.3.2. SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION  
 
In Linear Algebra, Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [135] is a factorization technique of a 
real or complex matrix. In signal processing SVD has been used in applications, e.g., watermarking, 
noise reduction, image compression, etc. According to the SVD theorem any rectangular matrix A 
of  m × n dimension can be decomposed into the product of three matrices: an orthogonal matrix 
U of size m × m, a diagonal matrix S of size m ×  n and the transpose of  a orthogonal matrix V 
of size n ×  n.  
Am×n =  Um×m Sm×n Vn×n 
The original matrix can be obtained by multiplying U, S, VT. 
A =  Um×m Sm×n Vn×n
T  
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SVD based watermarking techniques can be categorized into many categories [9], such as, by 
modification right/left singular vectors of the host images, modification of all singular vectors, 
hybrid transformation techniques which combines SVD with other transformations( DWT,  DFT, 
DCT, etc.), etc. 
7.4. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
We propose a solution for privacy preserving secure biometric authentication scheme using a 
watermarking technique. We consider two biometric traits, face image ( 𝐼 ) and fingerprint( 𝐹) for 
biometric watermarking authentication purpose and extract the feature vectors from both of these 
biometrics. To make the entire authentication procedure secure we perform some specific 
transformations on the real biometric feature vectors and use transformed biometrics instead of the 
real biometrics. The reason behind distorting the feature vectors is to make the authentication more 
secure. Therefore even if any adversary manages to get the watermarked feature vector, they will 
not be able to get the transformed matrices. Since anyone’s face image can be captured by any 
adversary we watermark the transformed face image with the transformed finger print image to 
make it more secure. We use a linear transformation, i.e., rotation on the actual feature vectors and 
denote it as transformed feature vector. We watermark the transformed feature vector of face image 
(𝑇𝑆𝐼) with transformed feature vector of fingerprint (𝑇𝑆𝐹) using the SVD based watermarking 
technique. Further computation for authentication is performed on the watermarked biometric. The 
watermarked feature vector is stored in the server to authenticate any user.  To preserve the privacy 
of the user’s watermarked biometrics we encrypt the watermarked biometrics using homomorphic 
encryption at both the server end and user end. A user is authenticated by calculating the Euclidean 
distance between the encrypted watermarked biometric provided from the user end and the 
encrypted watermarked biometric from the server end. Since the Euclidean distance between cipher 
texts will be calculated we use a homomorphic encryption technique as it allows computation on 
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cipher texts. If the distance less than some threshold value 𝜏, this indicates that the user is 
authenticate. The overall flow of the entire authentication procedure is given in Fig. 25. 
 
Figure 25: Overall flow of the authentication mechanism 
 
7.4.1. ALGORITHM 
 
In this section we describe the algorithm (Algorithm 7.1) for the proposed solution. First the feature 
vectors of the user’s face image and finger print will be extracted. The feature vectors will be 
distorted using some linear transformation, e.g., rotation (Algorithm 7.1 line 5-6). To watermark 
the transformed face image, 𝑅𝐼𝑓𝑣 with the transformed finger print, 𝑅𝐹𝑓𝑣 we use SVD based 
watermarking technique [21] (Algorithm 7.1 line 7). The rest of the computations will be performed 
on the watermarked feature vector 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣.  
We use the ElGamal encryption scheme to encrypt the watermarked feature vector 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣. 
Algorithm 7.1 at the user end computes 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗])and 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]
2)) and sends them to the 
server (Algorithm 7.1 line 8-12). The server already has the watermarked transformed feature 
vector for all users. To check the authentication the server computes the Euclidean distance between 
the encrypted feature vectors 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣 and 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣 for a particular user (Algorithm 7.1 line 13). The 
server computes  
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                     𝐶 =  ∏ 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣([𝑖,𝑗]
2))𝑚,𝑛𝑖,𝑗=1 𝐸(𝑔
𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗])−2(𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]
2
)         (15) 
which is the Euclidean distance between the encrypted feature vectors. The decrypted Euclidean 
distance 𝐷(𝐶) =  𝜕 ≤ 𝜏 denotes that the user is authentic. 
INPUT: User’s finger print 𝐹, user’s face image 𝐼 
Steps: 
1. Generate private key–public key pair (x, y) where x is the private key and y is the public 
key. 
2. The server 𝑆 keeps a database 𝐷𝐵 for all users watermarked biometrics 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣 
3. Get the feature vector matrix 𝐹𝑓𝑣  of finger print 𝐹 
4. Get the feature vector matrix 𝐼𝑓𝑣 of face image 𝐼 
5. Rotate on face image feature vector, 𝑅𝐼𝑓𝑣 =  Rotation(𝐹𝑓𝑣) 
6. Rotate on finger print feature vector, 𝑅𝐹𝑓𝑣 =  Rotation(𝐼𝑓𝑣) 
7. Run SVD based watermarking method to watermark 𝑅𝐼𝑓𝑣 with 𝑅𝐹𝑓𝑣. The resulting 
biometric for user 𝑈𝑖 becomes 𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣 
8. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 
9. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚 
10.        Compute 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗])and 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]
2)) and send to server 
11. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
12. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
13. Server computes  𝐶 = ∏ 𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣([𝑖,𝑗]
2))𝑚,𝑛𝑖,𝑗=1 𝐸(𝑔
𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗])−2(𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]𝐸(𝑔𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]
2
) 
14. Server decrypts 𝐶 with private key 𝑥 to obtain   𝐷(𝐶) =  𝑔
∑ (𝑊𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗]− 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑓𝑣[𝑖,𝑗] )
2𝑚,𝑛
𝑖,𝑗=1  
15. 𝑖𝑓 𝐷(𝐶) ≤ 𝜏 
16.        User is authentic 
17. 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
18.        Discard user 
19. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Algorithm 7.1. 
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7.5. SYSTEM ANALYSIS  
 
In this section we analyze the proposed solution in terms of correctness, privacy and performance. 
7.5.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 7.1 it should be shown that the server and the user compute 
the Euclidean distance without knowing the plain text of the feature vectors. Line no. 14 of 
Algorithm 7.1 can be proved by the homomorphic property of the ElGamal algorithm. 
 
7.5.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we discuss the privacy of the proposed solution. We assume that the server is secure. 
Algorithm 7.1 is secure in a semi-honest model [31]. The user sends the encrypted biometrics to 
the server. Therefore any adversary will obtain nothing but the encrypted watermarked feature 
vector. Moreover the server does the computation on the cipher texts to obtain the distance, which 
implies that Algorithm 7.1 is secure in a semi honest model. The only decrypted text is the 
encrypted distance from which no one can learn about the user’s biometrics which indicates privacy 
is preserved in our proposed solution. 
89 
 
7.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
7.6.1. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
 
To test the performance we considered different face images sizes varying from 3KB–7KB and 
embed different finger prints on them using the watermarking technique. Before watermarking the 
face image we extracted the feature vectors of the face image and finger print and transformed them 
by a linear transformation technique. To extract the feature vector of biometrics we used the PCA 
- based Face Recognition System package using Matlab [60]. For watermarking, we used the SVD 
based watermarking technique proposed in [21]. To implement our technique we used the Java 
programming language and JAMA package [136], since feature vector comes in the form of a 
matrix. We used the SVD based watermarking technique, but because of the constraint of the 
JAMA package for SVD calculation we modified the library so that it would work for any type of 
feature vector matrix. The existing JAMA package works correctly only for a full rank  𝑚 ×
𝑛 matrices with 𝑚 ≥  𝑛. 
7.6.2. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
We evaluate the performance of our technique in terms of time for different modules, namely, 
watermarking time, encryption time and distance calculation time.  Fig. 26 shows the computation 
time to watermark the face image with finger print image using SVD based watermarking at the 
user end for different file sizes. We vary the file sizes from 3KB to 7 KB with 1KB intervals. Fig. 
26 shows that if we increase the face image size then the time to watermark the biometrics increases 
almost linearly.  
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Figure 26: Computation time of watermarking for different file sizes 
 
We encrypt the watermarked face image with ElGamal encryption. Fig. 27 depicts the time to 
encrypt the watermarked feature vector at the user end for different sizes of face images. The time 
to encrypt the watermarked face images increases linearly with increasing face image sizes. The 
user is authentic if the distance between the encrypted watermarked biometric at the user end and 
at the server end is below some threshold value 𝜏.  
 
 
Figure 27: Computation time of encryption for different file sizes 
Fig. 28 shows the computation time to calculate distance for a particular user at the server side.  
From Fig. 28 it is evident that with the increasing face image size the time to calculate distance 
increases linearly.  
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Figure 28: Computation time to calculate distance for different file sizes 
 
7.8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We propose a secure privacy preserving technique to authenticate a user in a system using user 
biometrics. We transform the user biometric and watermark the face image with finger print to 
secure the authentication technique. To preserve the privacy of users watermarked biometric we 
encrypt it using homomorphic encryption. The analysis of our system proves the correctness and 
privacy of our scheme. The performance analysis shows the efficiency of our technique since time 
to authenticate a particular user is less than 3 seconds where the face image size is 7KB. 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
3 4 5 6 7
Ti
m
e
 in
 s
e
co
n
d
s
File size in KB
92 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION FOR SECURE MOBILE 
PAYMENTS 
 
 
8.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Mobile devices face various challenges when it comes to M-commerce applications because of low 
bandwidth, low security, low computation power and highly complex device configurations. With 
the increase in mobile applications, security and privacy becomes a concern for mobile payments. 
There has been a lot of focus on mobile payments architectures in recent years. All the architectures 
revolve under how to perform transactions securely. Some of the technologies used for mobile 
commerce are NFC [137] a short range communication protocol, Mobile wallet [138] etc. Mobile 
wallet is an application residing on the mobile device which holds the information regarding the 
credit cards and can be used for payments as well. Authenticating these applications using existing 
mechanism is not sufficient; we need a more secure mechanism to authenticate mobile payment 
applications which resists theft of devices and other known attacks where user credentials are 
compromised. 
Authentication is major requirement to secure any application, device or account. Biometric 
authentication mechanisms have gained popularity as they are more secure and offer non 
repudiation. A biometric authentication mechanism is proposed in [53] to secure mobile payments. 
It uses the public key of the bank to encrypt the credit card information and hashes of finger print 
to send to the bank. The bank server has information regarding all the users and their finger print 
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information. This method doesn't protect the privacy of the user. In [54], the authors have specified 
an identity based encryption (IBE) and biometric scheme for secure data access in the cloud. The 
biometric scheme used here authenticates the user and the IBE scheme was used to encrypt and 
decrypt the data. Ross and Othman [55] used visual cryptography to protect the privacy of a user. 
They decompose a user’s biometric template into two noise like images using visual cryptography 
and store them in two distinct databases. During authentication these images are laid together to 
create a temporary biometric template for verification. The main advantage of this mechanism is 
that the biometric information is never exposed to an attacker as there is more than a single 
database. This method is practically very expensive as it requires maintaining two databases and 
during authentication the search process is doubled. Barni et al. [56] designed a privacy preserving 
protocol for finger print identification using finger codes. This protocol uses a multi-party 
computation approach and makes use of the homomorphic properties of the pallier cryptosystem. 
Feng et al. [57] used cancellable biometrics and proposed a three step hybrid approach for face 
template protection. All the biometric authentication mechanisms used are computationally very 
expensive because of the low computation power of mobile devices.  
As mentioned in [16], the Dutch Company Moxomo uses Personal Identification Number (PIN) to 
confirm the purchase and the payment is directly debited to the merchant's mobile wallet. The 
wallet can be charged again to pay a merchant's bank account or pay to another mobile phone. Our 
application uses a direct debit solution for mobile payments. Though our transaction procedure uses 
a direct debit method, it still authenticates the user before a transaction. Our application 
incorporates the RSA scheme with a direct debit method, i.e., it uses the RSA scheme for user 
authentication before transferring the payment amount from the user’s bank account to the 
merchant’s bank account. The proposed biometric authentication mechanism makes use of cloud 
services to perform computations thereby reducing load on mobile devices. Moreover biometrics 
data are very sensitive, and we need to protect the privacy of the user. So we propose a privacy 
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preserving secure biometric authentication which is not only very fast compared to traditional 
password based authentication mechanisms, but is also more secure and protects the privacy of the 
user. 
8.2. DESIGN CONSIDERATION 
 
To formalize the problem statement, there is a cloud server SI which maintains and keeps track of 
database a  𝐷𝐼. If there are 𝑛  authorized registered users < 𝑈𝑎 ,𝑈𝑏 , … . . , 𝑈𝑛 > then 𝐷𝐼 consists of 
𝑛  number of entries, < 𝐷𝑈𝑎 , 𝐷𝑈𝑏 , … … , 𝐷𝑈𝑛 >. Each entry 𝐷𝑈𝑖 , in 𝐷𝐼  contains user 𝑈𝑖
′𝑠 templates 
𝑡. For secure mobile payments the application uses feature vector 𝑓𝑐 of a user 𝑈𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈
[1, 𝑛]. We design a privacy preserving algorithm to decide whether a user's biometric feature vector 
belongs to at least one of the templates stored in the server database  𝐷𝐼. Our system checks whether 
                                                         𝐸 < 𝐷𝑈𝑘  > = 𝐸 < 𝐷𝑈𝑖 >                                                               (16) 
Here 𝐸 < 𝐷𝑈𝑘  >  is the encrypted template that belongs to server and 𝐸 < 𝐷𝑈𝑖 >  is the encrypted 
feature vector data that belongs to user 𝑖. Our algorithm decides whether there exists a user 𝑈𝑖  and 
a biomteric template 𝑡 stored in 𝐷𝐼 such that the distance between 𝑓𝑐  and 𝑡 is below a threshold ϵ. 
We write this requirement as 
                                                                           𝛿(𝑓𝑐 , 𝑡) < ϵ                                                              (17) 
Suppose that the biometrics feature vector has 𝑚 dimensions. For any feature vector 𝑓𝑐, and any 
𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑚], we use 𝑓[𝑗] to denote the 𝑗𝑡ℎ component of 𝑓𝑐. Hence equation (17) is equivalent to 
                                                                ∑ (𝑓𝑐[𝑗] − 𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2 <  ϵ2𝑚𝑗=1                                     (18) 
 
8.3. SCHEMES 
Preserving privacy is very important in a mobile application when it deals with mobile payments 
which include bank transactions. In our system, a registered user logs in to their application and 
pays for their purchases via the bank. To make the entire procedure secure we focus on 
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authenticated user login and secure bank transactions. For an authenticated user login we propose 
a new scheme named Privacy Preserving Biometric based Authentication Algorithm and for secure 
bank transactions we incorporate RSA encryption scheme on the direct debit method. In the 
following two subsections we discuss about these two schemes.  
8.3.1. PRIVACY PRESERVING BIOMETRIC BASED AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM 
In this subsection we discuss details about the Privacy–preserving Biometric–based Authentication 
Algorithm. We design the Privacy–preserving Biometric–based Authentication Algorithm using 
Paillier encryption [4]. We use 𝐸𝑦( ) to denote Paillier encryption using public key 𝑦. That is, for 
any clear text 𝑚, 𝐸𝑦(𝑚) means encrypting 𝑚 using public key 𝑦.  Similarly, we use 𝐷𝑥( )  to denote 
Paillier decryption using private key 𝑥. We use the homomorphic property of Paillier encryption in 
our algorithm. For any clear texts 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, for any public key 𝑦, 𝐸𝑦(𝑚1)𝐸𝑦(𝑚2), is equal to an 
encryption of clear text  𝑚1 + 𝑚2 using public key 𝑦.  
We use a user's biometric (e.g., face image, finger print, etc.) feature vector which is input to our 
algorithm. The server database stores the templates of all the users biometric feature vectors. The 
goal of the algorithm is to decide whether the user's biometric feature vector matches any biometric 
template stored in server, without revealing the user's feature vector and the templates stored in the 
server. The main idea is that we encrypt the user's feature vector using the Paillier scheme and send 
the cipher text to the server for matching. The details of our Privacy–preserving Biometric–based 
Authentication Algorithm are shown in Algorithm 8.1.  
1. Mobile Application randomly generates a pair of keys (𝑥, 𝑦) where 𝑥 is the private key and 
𝑦 is the public key. 
2. Generate some random numbers 𝑟 and save them in a list 𝑅. 
3. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 each element r and each row of the feature vector matrix 𝑑𝑜 
4. Go to the particular 𝑟𝑡ℎ element of the row and generate hash value 𝐻 of that element. 
5.   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡ℎ and (𝑟 + 1)𝑡ℎelement of 𝐻 is equal to some predefined pattern (e.g.”11”) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
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6.        Save the location of that element in a list 𝐿  
7.    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓  
8. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
9. 𝑚 is the length of 𝐿 
10. Mobile application encrypts all the elements in 𝐿 and sends it to the server  
11. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚 𝑑𝑜 
12.     Mobile application encrypts 𝑓𝑐[𝑗] using 𝑦 : 𝐹𝑐[𝑗] =  𝐸𝑦(𝑓𝑐[𝑗]) 
13.     Mobile application encrypts the square of 𝑓𝑐[𝑗] using 𝑦 : 𝐺𝑐[𝑗] =  𝐸𝑦((𝑓𝑐[𝑗])
2) 
14. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
15. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 𝑑𝑜 
16.   Mobile application sends 𝑦, 𝐹𝑐 , 𝐺𝑐 to server. 
17. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
18. Server decrypts 𝐿 
19. 𝑓𝑜𝑟 each template 𝑡𝑖,𝑘 where (𝑖, 𝑘) ∈ 𝐿 in server database 𝑑𝑜 
20.    Server computes  𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  ∏
𝐸𝑦((𝑡𝑖,𝑘 )
2
)𝐺𝑐[𝑗]
(𝐹𝑐[𝑗])
2𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗]
𝑚
𝑗=1   
21. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
22. Server decrypts each 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑖,𝑘 one by one 
23.  𝑖𝑓  any clear text obtained from the decryption is less than 𝜖2 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
24.     Server accepts the user. 
25.  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
26.     Server rejects the user. 
27. 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
28. Server sends the message to the mobile application whether to accept or reject the user.    
Algorithm 8.1: Privacy – Preserving Biometric – based Authentication Algorithm 
First the Mobile application captures the user's feature vector and generates a public key–private 
key pair (x,y) to use in the Paillier encryption scheme, line 1 Algorithm 8.1.To make the entire 
procedure efficient in terms of time complexity we randomly sample the input data and save the 
location of these randomly selected data in a list L. Algorithm 8.1 line 2-8 do the random 
sampling. The main objective behind the random sampling on the input data is to make our system 
more efficient, light weight and reduce the time complexity for user log in without losing 
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correctness. L is of size ≤ 𝑚 if the feature vector matrix is of size 𝑚 𝑋 𝑛. The mobile application 
encrypts each element 𝐹𝑐[𝑗] of L and its square 𝐺𝑐[𝑗] using the public key y and send y along with 
𝐹𝑐 and 𝐺𝑐 to the server, line 10-17 Algorithm 8.1. The server encrypts the square of each template 
𝑡𝑖,𝑘 and compute  (𝐹𝑐[𝑗])
2𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗] and 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘, line 19-21 Algorithm 8.1. Server also decrypts 
𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘one by one. Any plain text less than the threshold value 𝜖
2 indicates that the user is 
authentic. If all the decrypted squared distances are above the threshold 𝜖2; it implies that the 
user's feature vector does not match any template in the server and rejects the user. 
8.3.2. SECURE TRANSACTION USING RSA ENCRYPTION SCHEME 
For secure bank transactions we incorporate the RSA scheme on the direct debit method. In the 
RSA scheme if the public key and private key are (𝑛, 𝑒) and (𝑑, 𝑒) respectively, where 𝑛 = 𝑝 ×
 𝑞 and p, q are prime numbers, then the cipher text 𝑐 for a message 𝑚 is 
                                                               𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)                                                                           (19) 
The decryption equation to get the original message 𝑚 from 𝑐 is 
                                                                      𝑚 = 𝑐𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)                                                                    (20) 
Here we assume that the public key-private key pair (𝑛, 𝑒) and (𝑑, 𝑒) to be used for the RSA scheme 
is known beforehand to the user bank and the user. The secure transaction procedure is shown in 
Fig. 29 below. The mobile application creates a connection to the user bank when the user proceeds 
check out. The mobile application sends the payment amount to the user bank as well. To 
authenticate the user the user bank sends an encrypted challenge (e.g., a personal question) using 
the public key and the RSA encryption scheme to the user. During a secure transaction we use the 
RSA scheme for each encryption and decryption. The user decrypts the challenge using the private 
key and encrypts the answer. The mobile application sends the encrypted answer to the user bank. 
The user bank checks if the decrypted answer is correct or not. If the answer is correct, then the 
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user bank will proceed with the direct debit payment procedure and will create a connection to the 
merchant bank. The user bank requests the merchant bank for merchant authorization. If the 
merchant is authorized then the user bank will execute the transaction from the user bank account 
to the merchant bank account. 
 
Figure 29: Secure Transaction using RSA encryption scheme 
 
8.4. ANALYSIS 
We analyze our Privacy–preserving Biometric–based Authentication Algorithm in terms of 
correctness, privacy and complexity. In the following subsections we discuss about the Correctness 
Analysis, Privacy Analysis and Complexity Analysis respectively. 
8.4.1. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS 
We now show that our algorithm is correct. From the description above, we can see that the key 
point is to show that 𝐷𝑥(𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘) = ∑ (𝑓𝑐[𝑗] − 𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2𝑚
𝑗=1  , ∀𝑖, 𝑘. Given the homomorphic 
property of Paillier scheme ∀𝑖, 𝑘 we have 
𝐷𝑥(𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘) 
= 𝐷𝑥( ∏
𝐸𝑦((𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2)𝐺𝑐[𝑗]
(𝐹𝑐[𝑗])
2𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗]
𝑚
𝑗 =1 ) 
= 𝐷𝑥( ∏
𝐸𝑦((𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2)𝐺𝑐[𝑗]
(𝐸𝑦(𝑓𝑐[𝑗])
2𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
𝑚
𝑗 =1  
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=∑ ((𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2 + (𝑓𝑐[𝑗])
2 − (𝑓𝑐[𝑗]
2𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])𝑚𝑗=1  
= ∑ (𝑓𝑐[𝑗] − 𝑡𝑖,𝑘[𝑗])
2𝑚
𝑗=1  
 
This proves the correctness of Algorithm 8.1. 
8.4.2. PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
In this subsection we explain that our algorithm is privacy preserving in the semi-honest model. In 
Algorithm 8.1 we can see that the mobile application encrypts the user biometric feature vector and 
sends it to the server. The server receives only 𝐹𝑐[𝑗] and 𝐺𝑐[𝑗] which are cipher texts. Therefore any 
adversary or the server cannot learn  𝑓𝑐[𝑗], i.e., the biometric feature vector but the cipher texts. 
Here we assume that the server is secure. The server calculates the 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘  which is composed 
of multiplications and divisions of encrypted feature vectors. After calculating 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘  the server 
sends the approval or disapproval of user authentication to the application which does not involve 
an exchange of the feature vector. Our algorithm is secure in the -honest model since no third party 
can learn anything about the original message. 
8.4.3. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
We analyze the computation cost of our Algorithm 8.1. The operations on the mobile application 
include encryption of 𝑓𝑐[𝑗] and its square ∀ 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑚]. Therefore the computation cost at mobile 
application becomes 2𝑚 × 𝑇𝐸  where 𝑇𝐸  is the encryption cost and 𝑚 is the length of final selected 
sampled list L of feature vector elements to be encrypted. The cloud server computes 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘 for 
each template 𝑡𝑖,𝑘  where 𝑖, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐿  and decrypts each 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘 in the worst case. The server also 
decrypts all the elements in the final selected list 𝐿 and this decryption takes 𝑙 ×  𝑇𝐷. The 
computation of 𝑆𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑘 requires 𝑚 Paillier encryptions and 𝑂(𝑚) multiplications. The 
computation cost at the server becomes 𝑙 × 𝑚 × 𝑇𝐸 + 𝑙 × 𝑂(𝑚) × 𝑇𝑀 + 𝑙 × 𝑇𝐷 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑙 is the 
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number of templates belonging to the final selected random sampled list and 𝑇𝑀 is the cost of one 
multiplication. 
8.5. IMPROVING OUR SYSTEM USING CLOUD  
As the number of stores and users increase, there will be huge amounts of data for store details and 
users. In order to accommodate these increasing users and handle large amounts of data, it would 
be beneficial to incorporate cloud computing with our application. Cloud computing because of its 
characteristics such as on demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid 
elasticity and measure service, would be a perfect fit for our application model. Since we don’t 
know the exact increase or decrease in data and number of users, on demand self-service would be 
useful as the cloud can adjust to these situations without human intervention. Users can use various 
kinds of devices to access this service as cloud provides a broad network access. This can also 
accommodate multiple stores or companies to manage their data at the same time using resource 
pooling and also can manage their resources to scale upwards or downwards using rapid elasticity. 
Since cloud is a measured service the stores or the companies participating will pay only for the 
services they used. Because of the cloud’s advantages, the authors in [6] have specified a identity 
based encryption (IBE) and biometric scheme for secure data access in cloud. The biometric 
scheme was used here to authenticate the user and IBE scheme was used to encrypt and decrypt the 
data. One of the major benefits of using the cloud would be to execute the privacy preserving 
authentication algorithm more efficiently using computation resources available in the cloud. With 
a large number of users, an authentication mechanism using a single server will result in traffic 
bottlenecks and there will be delays in scheduling them. Using the cloud we can avoid this scenario 
by efficiently scheduling the jobs on multiple instances of cloud. 
101 
 
8.6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
8.6.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
We have designed and developed an Android mobile application for secure mobile payments. To 
implement this application we used the Java programming language on computers with 3.33 GHz 
Intel Core i5 processor, 4 GB RAM, 64 bit operating system. To test our application we used 
Google Nexus 7 with Android version 4.2.1.  We implemented our system by developing an 
Android application using Android SDK and Android Developer Tools (ADT). The main system 
components are connected to each other by the Internet. The communication between the server 
and the application is realized by Java Platform, Enterprise Edition (Java EE) and Java EE APIs. 
We use the javax.servlet package and HTTP requests which includes Java Server Pages (JSP) 
specification. To implement the communication between two banks and with the user we use 
javax.servlet packages. MySQL was used as the database. For extracting the feature vector from 
user biometrics we used the PCA-based Face Recognition System package in Matlab [60]. This 
package implements a PCA-based face recognition method which considers a face image as an 
input and checks whether the input matches with any face image entry from the database or not. To 
implement the method this package generates the feature vector matrix for the input face image and 
applies further implementation steps on that. Our algorithm requires only the feature vector matrix 
as input and therefore we use the intermediate result, i.e., feature vector matrix for our algorithm 
and do not need to implement the entire package.  To test the efficiency of our system we use real 
world data, i.e., original face image as input to the application. 
8.6.2. METRICS 
To test the scalability of our system we check the time the mobile application takes in its different 
modules. Since the RSA scheme has already been extensively studied in terms of efficiency we 
focus on the efficiency of our Privacy - Preserving Biometric–based Authentication Algorithm. We 
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use our algorithm for secure log in and hence check the time efficiency for the log in module only. 
The entire log in time consists of the encryption time and the computation time in the cloud 
server.Using the Privacy-Preserving Biometric–based Authentication Algorithm we test time 
efficiency for encryption, computation in cloud server and log in procedure. 
8.6.3. RESULTS 
We test the scalability of our application in terms of time efficiency. To test the efficiency of our 
system we consider real-world datasets. Since the input to our mobile application is a face image 
we considered a set of real face images as the input. To test the time efficiency we vary the size of 
the input, i.e., the size of the face image. In Algorithm 8.1 instead of doing computation on all of 
the elements in the user's feature vector matrix we sample it randomly (as mentioned in Algorithm 
8.1 line no. 2 - 8) and this makes Algorithm 8.1 efficient in terms of time without losing its 
correctness. To show efficiency we first check how long the application takes if the application 
does the computation on all the elements of the feature vector matrix and we name this approach 
as the primitive approach of our experiment. After that we compare this result with our two 
efficiency enhancement efforts, namely, using multi-threading and then random sampling.  We 
label our efficiency enhancement efforts for algorithm 8.1 as efficiency enhanced approach using 
multi-threading and efficiency enhanced approach using random sampling in this chapter. As 
mentioned in the previous subsection we test the efficiency for encryption, computation in the cloud 
server and log in procedure. Therefore we test the efficiency of encryption time at the end user, 
computation time in the cloud server, elapsed time for the log in procedure using the primitive 
approach, multithreading approach and random sampling approach in the next three sub-
subsections. 
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8.6.3.1.  ENCRYPTION TIME AT END-USER  
Fig. 30 shows the encryption time of Algorithm 8.1, i.e., results from the primitive approach, 
efficiency enhanced approach using multithreading, and efficiency enhanced approach using 
random sampling with variable sizes of data. Here size of data/image varies at 3KB, 4KB, 5KB, 
6KB and 7KB. For the maximum size of data we tested, i.e., 7KB the primitive approach, efficiency 
enhanced approach using multithreading, efficiency enhanced approach using random sampling 
took 3.7, 3.01 and 0.02 seconds respectively. 
 
Figure 30: Encryption time at end – user 
 
8.6.3.2  COMPUTATION TIME IN SERVER 
Fig. 31 shows the computation time in the server for the three approaches, that is, the primitive 
approach and efficiency enhanced approaches. Here computation time of the server includes the 
Square distance calculation time in the server, checking user authentication and sending the 
response back to the mobile application. To test the time efficiency of computation in the server 
we vary the size of the input data at 3KB, 4KB, 5KB, 6KB and 7KB. For the maximum size of data 
we tested, i.e., 7KB the primitive approach, efficiency enhanced approach using multithreading, 
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efficiency enhanced approach using random sampling took 1.97, 1.83 and 0.19 seconds 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 31: Computation time in Server 
 
8.6.3.3.  ELAPSE TIME IN LOG IN PROCEDURE 
Fig. 32 shows the elapsed time for Log in to our mobile application. Here Log in time mainly 
depends on the encryption time and computation time in the cloud server. To test the time efficiency 
for Log in to the mobile application we vary the size of the input data at 3KB, 4KB, 5KB, 6KB and 
7KB. For the maximum size of data we tested, i.e., 7KB the primitive approach, efficiency 
enhanced approach using multithreading, efficiency enhanced approach using random sampling 
took 5.58, 5.05 and 0.26 seconds respectively. 
105 
 
 
Figure 32: Elapse time in Log In Procedure 
 
8.7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have designed and developed a mobile application for secure mobile payments. 
To make this application secure we focus on secure user login to the mobile application and secure 
transaction from the bank. For secure login we use biometrics and have proposed a new algorithm 
named Privacy preserving Biometric based Authentication Algorithm. For secure transaction we 
used RSA encryption scheme on direct debit method. We analyzed our novel Privacy preserving 
Biometric based Authentication Algorithm in terms of time. Further we tested the efficiency of our 
algorithm on real world data sets and achieved expected results. The rigorous experiments on 
different approaches of our algorithm reflect the efficiency of our algorithm in a real world scenario. 
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  CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
9.1. CONCLUSION 
Data can contain sensitive information about its entities and when sharing with others it can be a 
threat to privacy. With the rapid growth of online world, electronic data, cyberspaces data become 
vulnerable to privacy and security threats. Sharing data in a privacy preserving way has become a 
real challenge as it involves sharing data among two to multiple number of parties without revealing 
confidential information. Data privacy is important in a wide range of industries such as, healthcare, 
aviation industry, education system, federal law enforcement agencies, retail, financial services, 
etc. In this thesis we propose privacy preserving algorithms for emergent computing environments, 
namely, health care, data mining, biometrics, mobile payments, and distributed cloud computing 
environment.  
Linking medical records across different medical service providers is important to the enhancement 
of health care quality and public health surveillance. In records linkage, protecting patients’ privacy 
is a primary requirement. In real-world medical records may contain errors such as typos. Linking 
the error-prone data and preserving data privacy at the same time are very difficult. Existing privacy 
preserving solutions for this problem are only restricted to textual data. To enable different medical 
service providers to link their error-prone data in a private way, we provided a holistic solution by 
designing and developing a medical record linkage system for medical service providers. 
Identifying frequent patterns in medical records is important as it helps to find disease pattern, 
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patient path, effective treatment, etc. Extracting sequential patterns collaboratively and privately 
on the medical data sets held across the multiple medical sites is a challenging task. In this thesis 
we proposed a privacy preserving sequential pattern mining algorithm across multiple medical 
sites. 
In the distributed cloud storage and computation on resources are provided to users in a distributed 
peer-to-peer fashion. Data protection is a concern in the distributed cloud as resources are provided 
by the other users. Confidentiality, integrity and availability are three major security concerns’ 
along with privacy when resources are provided by others. Data confidentiality and integrity can 
be achieved using encryption mechanisms.  To preserve security and privacy of data in a distributed 
cloud, we proposed a privacy preserving algorithm using a cryptography technique. Managing 
secret key is difficult in the distributed cloud. To provide security of the secret key we proposed a 
multilevel threshold secret sharing scheme in the distributed cloud. 
Biometric authentication ensures user identity by means of users’ biometric traits. Multimodal 
biometric authentication uses more than one biometric trait of a user. Though biometrics are unique 
and secure, it can be still stolen or misused by any adversary. Protecting biometrics is important as 
it is a unique trait of any user. In our work we provide a secure and privacy preserving biometric 
authentication scheme using watermarking technique. Mobile payments needs privacy and security 
as it involves bank transaction. We proposed a privacy preserving biometric based authentication 
algorithm for secure mobile payments. 
9.2. FUTURE WORK 
Our future work will include proposing privacy preserving techniques in different computing 
environments such as big data, distributed cloud environment, social networking sites, wireless 
sensor networks etc.  
Big data refers to the collection of massive electronic data collected by different organizations. The 
mainstream definition of big data is defined by high volume, velocity and variety. Different 
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software and platforms, large scale of cloud infrastructures, large computer networks are required 
to work with these data which increases privacy and security threats to these huge collection of 
data. Big data is collected by different organizations across different domains, such as, health care, 
social networking etc. As the data contains sensitive, private data, privacy becomes a serious issue 
for big data.  Several issues of privacy in big data are secure data storage and transaction logs, real 
time security monitoring, privacy preserving data mining and analysis, etc. 
Cloud computing delivers computing as a service. It is the set of resources and services offered 
through the internet and delivered from data centers located throughout the world. It is easy to 
manipulate data in the cloud and easy to lose control of the data at the same time.  As privacy is a 
concern in the online world and storing private data somewhere in the cyberspace leads to major 
threats to privacy of the sensitive data. Vulnerability of the security/privacy of data leads to the 
need for privacy preserving techniques in the cloud computing field. 
Social networking sites such as, Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Instagram, Twitter, etc. play 
significant role in our everyday life. These networking sites contain a lot of information, personal 
as well as professional. As these online social networking sites become an integral part of our life 
there is a lot of opportunity for the information available on these sites to be exposed. Risks for 
social network users and the information shared on these networks are identity theft, advertising 
harassment/spam, unauthorized physical and network access, misuse of computer, sensitive 
information or social profile, etc. Considering the various threats and security issues in social 
networking sites, preserving privacy is a real need in this field.  
Wireless sensor networks are used to monitor physical and environmental conditions such as 
temperature, sound, vibration, pressure etc. Security is a challenge in wireless sensor networks 
because of sensor node sizes, density of networks, physical attacks to unattended sensors, attacks 
on the security mechanism or routing mechanisms, attacks on information transmitted over the 
network etc.   Keeping into account of all the security vulnerabilities privacy preserving techniques 
are needed in wireless sensor networks.  
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Besides all the above mentioned computing fields, privacy threats are real concern in various other 
computing fields too, such as, Internet, software defined networks, bioinformatics, password 
management, computer networks, etc. 
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